An analysis of the causes of the fall of the military government of Nigeria under general Yakubu Gowon, 1966-1975, 1983 by Inegbedion, Sidney E. (Author) & Bailey (Degree supervisor)
AN ANALYSIS OF THE CAUSES OF THE FALL OF THE 
MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF NIGERIA UNDER 
GENERAL YAKUBU GOWON, 1966-1975 
A THESIS 
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF ATLANTA UNIVERSITY 
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR 
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS 
BY 
SIDNEY E. INEGBEDION 
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 
JULY 1983 
R L-LV T &0 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
LIST OF TABLES  iii 
LIST OF FIGURES  iv 
INTRODUCTION  1 
CHAPTER 
I. THE RISE OF THE MILITARY IN NIGERIAN POWER POLITICS  6 
The Nigerian Army Before 1966  7 
Weakness of the First Republic  12 
Influence of the Decade of Military 
Coups in Africa  16 
II. THE PERFORMANCE OF THE MILITARY 
GOVERNMENT UNDER GENERAL YAKUBU GOWON  19 
National Unity  22 
Management of the Nigerian Civil War  29 
Economic Development Efforts  32 
III. POWER INTEREST GROUP WITHIN THE NIGERIAN ARMED FORCES  46 
IV. GENERAL GOWON'S ADMINISTRATIVE INEFFECTIVENESS IN 
DEALING WITH THE CONTINUING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC 
PROBLEM AFTER THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR  68 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 78 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table Page 
1. Nigeria Ethnic Structure of Pre-1963 Pigions  28 
2. Chart Showing Nigeria Labor Distribution in 1963  34 
3. Selected Economic Indices of Nigeria During the 
Reign of General Yakubu Gowon  38 
4. The Positions Occupied by the Officers Who Ousted 
Gowon During the Nigerian Civil War, Soon After the 
Civil War, and After the Subsequent Overthrow of General 
Yakubu Gowon from Office as the Head of State and 
Commander-in-Chief of the Nigerian Armed Forces  64 
5. The New Ranks of Gowon's Ousters and the Days 
Their Promotion Became Effective  65 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure Page 
1. Political Map of Nigeria Showing Major Ethnic 
Groups and Pre-1967 Regional Boundaries  26 
2. Political Map of Nigeria Showing the Twelve 
States Structure as Created by General Yakubu 
Gowon, 1967-1975  27 
3. Chart Showing Nigerian Inter-trade Commodities 
Trade Exchanges Among Pre-1967 Regions  35 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the end of World War II in 1945, more than two-thirds of 
the countries in Latin America, Asia, and Africa have experienced 
varying levels of military intervention. According to an observation 
made by W.F. Gutteridge, in Africa alone, the frequency of coups ranked 
highest in the world between 1960 and 1970. He recorded that: 
Between January 1963 and the end of February 1966, 
there were fourteen significant cases of political 
intervention by the military in African independent 
states. By early 1968, there had been nineteen 
successful military coups and by the end of 1970, 
the total number of relevant major incidents in 
Africa in eight years was near to thirty.1 
The frequency with which African soldiers have entered the 
political arena has provided me with the challenge of analyzing military 
politics with special reference to my country, Nigeria. I have chosen 
to investigate the fall of the military regime under General Yakubu 
Gowon for my analysis for two reasons. First, the Gowon administration 
produced in Nigerian history the most stable military interegnum. 
Secondly, occurring at this time is the historical incidence of the 
emergence of some hitherto unknown soldiers into national prominence, 
and the sudden oil boom especially after the oil crisis of 1973, which 
has been the cornerstone of the structural distortion of the Nigerian 
1W. F. Gutteridge, Military Regimes in Africa, Studies in African 
History, Vol. II (London: Methuen and Company, Ltd., 1976), p. 1. 
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economy intensified by neo-colonialism. 
In discussing the fall of Gowon I have employed two assumptions 
which are that: 
(1) The fall of Gowon was largely due to the function of a 
powerful interest group within the Nigerian army; and 
(2) Gowon's government had become ineffective in dealing with 
those policies which had earlier made him god-like in the 
eyes of his subjects. 
Several writers among whom were Ayo Fasanmi, in his article 
2 
captioned "Corruption Rides On!" and the London Observer in an article 
3 
entitled "Can Gowon Halt Nigerian Corruption in Time?" have indicated 
that the Gowon's Administration was nothing but a corrupt government 
and being so it was appropriate that he be ousted. This study challenges 
that assumption. Rather, it introduces a new dimension of personality 
conflict, the adventent lust that some emmergent class had for power 
acquisition, as well as discusses the personal desire to "share from 
the nation's cake," that a group of the Nigerian army, whom I inter¬ 
changeably refer to throughout the study as either power interest 
group, or war officers had. 
For purposes of clarity, power interest group is used as a term 
in referring to some military officers who fought at the battlefront 
during the Nigerian Civil War. After the war, the officers constituted 
themselves as a faction within the Nigerian Army and sort the ousting 
? 
Ayo Fasanmi, "Corruption Rides On!" The Nigerian Tribune, 
April 23, 1975, pp. 4, 9. 
O 
Frank Thompson (correspondent), "Can Gowon Halt Nigerian Corruption 
in Time?" London Observer, February 19, 1975, p. 6. 
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of the Military Government of Nigeria under General Yakubu Gowon with 
a view of being the leaders of the country. Therefore, expressed views 
and other issues, especially those relating to the control of oil 
business which was the main economic resource of Nigeria at the time 
under study are used to examine my assertions. 
The historical analysis approach has been employed as the research 
methodology for this study. According to Jerome Clubb, in his essay 
"The Historical-Analytical Approach," this approach is a historical 
investigation which help facilitates findings of greater generality 
and increase the researchers confidence in the validity and relevance 
of his work. 
My rational for using this methodology is due to my personal 
limitation in terms of direct observation and participation. Beside 
this point, I felt that the study of political phenomena in a variety 
of historical context could (at least in principle) contribute to my 
developing generalizations which could serve me in better understanding 
the characteristics of Nigeria politics in its own content. 
The data for the study were collected through the following source; 
political science and economic textbooks, journals, magazines, government 
documents, speeches and broadcasts, newspapers, personal letters and 
interviews with some Nigerian citizens. 
The study is presented as follows: chapter one deals with the 
rise of the military in Nigerian power politics. It looks into the 
initial stages or beginning of the organization of special constabulary 
. M. Freeman, The Foundation of Political Science, New York: 
McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, 1972, p. 362. 
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forces by British traders during the second half of the nineteenth 
century. Using this as a base period, the chapter traces the historical 
developments from its successes and failures under the first Nigerian 
Civilian Administration to the army's intervention in Nigerian power 
politics. 
The historical and chronological sequence of the growth of the 
Nigerian army is given in this chapter to acquaint the reader with the 
events that follow in the remaining chapters. In addition, the chapter 
informs the reader about the post independent Nigerian political 
economy under the first rulers who led the country to independence in 
1960. 
Since the objective of this thesis is to test the assumption that 
the fall of Gowon was caused by the forces of a few military officers 
and not because of corruption, an indepth analysis of Yakubu Gowon's 
performance as the Chief Executive is given in chapter two. To better 
understand Gowon's regime, an objective critique of the Ironsi's 
Administration which preceded that of Gowon is provided. Dialectically, 
it is only with the understanding and comparing the shortcomings of 
both the civilian administration as well as the brief military leader¬ 
ship provided by General Aguiyi Ironsi that the reader would understand 
the Gowon's Administration, its milestone achievements, and the dynamics 
of its fal1. 
Continuing from the broad premises given in the first two chapters, 
chapter three examines the power interest group within the Nigerian 
armed forces. It is set out by reviewing theoretically the motives of 
-5- 
military intervention. It further discusses the issues of personality 
conflict, as well as competing ambition for control of the economy. 
Here again, emphasis is placed on the economic factor under a state 
capitalist economy to examine my assumptions. 
The complete work provides the reader with a detailed understanding 
of the contradictions and dynamics of Nigerian power politics beginning 
with the colonial era and ending in 1975. In addition, it helps to 
clarify, to a large extent, the level to which competition for available 
scarce resources developed an interest group as a class within the 
Nigerian army. 
Above all, it is hoped that this study could be used as a resource 
for a more detailed work in studying Nigerian military politics. 
CHAPTER I 
THE RISE OF THE MILITARY IN 
NIGERIAN POWER POLITICS 
The objective of this chapter is to trace the growth of the 
Nigerian army from the time of its inception to its participation in 
power politics. It looks into the initial stages when the army was 
organized as a special constabulary force by British traders during 
the second half of the nineteenth century. It further examines its 
successes and failures during thefirst Nigerian Civilian Administration, 
and finally, it examines the impact of coups in other African states 
on the Nigerian army using the contagion theory as a means of 
explanation. 
This historical explanation is very important in the study because 
all the aspects discussed when combined provide a useful basis for 
understanding the past and present dynamics of the Nigerian military. 
Above all it helps acquaint the reader with the internal contradictions 
within the army which finally led to the overthrow of General Yakubu 
Gowon. Therefore, the chapter examines the above factors in three 
settings, the historical development of the Nigerian army before 1966, 
the weaknesses of the first republic which increased the powers and 
vision of the army, as well as highlight the influence of the 
decade of military coups in Africa which acted as a catalyst in the 
Nigerian army coming into politics. 
-6- 
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The Nigerian Army Before 1966 
The Nigerian army has its origin in the second half of the nine¬ 
teenth century. The army was organized by the British explorers and 
traders, their purpose being "to help carry out the British conquest 
of what is now Nigeria."* The earliest of such organization was 
Glover's Hausas, a constabulary force organized at Lagos in 1863 by 
Lt. R. N. Glover. The Oil Rivers Irregulars, another constabulary 
force, was raised in the East Coast of Nigeria after the proclamation 
of the Oil River Protectorate in 1885. This force was later renamed 
Niger Coast Constabulary, and was stationed at Calabar. In addition 
to these forces was another force called the Royal Niger Company 
Constabulary. This later constabulary force was organized in the 
Northern part of Nigeria by Sir George Goldie. It was further reorganized 
in 1900 by Lord Lugard who renamed it Northern Nigerian Regiment. 
It was these various paramilitary establishments that were united 
to form the Nigerian Regiment to the West African Frontier Force in 
1914, at the time of Lord Lugard's amalgamation of Northern and Southern 
protectorates of Nigeria to form the present day Nigeria. 
Like all regiments of the West African Frontier Force, the Nigerian 
regiment having been established, was: 
Created not to defend the inhabitants against 
foreign attacks, but to assist foreigners to 
conquer the country. They had British officers 
but at least as far as the rank and file were 
concerned, they were mercenary armies. They 
IN. J. Miners, The Nigerian Army 1956-1966 (London: Methuen and 
Company, Ltd., 1969), p. 3. 
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were generally enlisted in the more backward 
parts of the country and were quite ready to 
suppress rebellions against colonial rule that 
might arise elsewhere.2 
This was evident during the 1948 riots in (Gold Coast) Ghana when 
two Nigerian battalions were sent there. Their purpose being to patrol 
troubled areas and to provide town piquets. 
Between 1957 and 1960 when Nigeria became independent, the 
functions of the military forces were localized, and the duties of the 
Royal Nigerian Army defined as the "immediate defense of Nigeria from 
outside attack, and to aid the civil power in the maintenance of 
internal security." 
Nigerian soldiers had not been very popular in the country. 
"Perhaps this was due to their origin, having evolved from poor and 
4 
runaway slaves," as well as being brutual to the masses of people. 
For example, in the nineteenth century, the Niger Coast Constabulary 
was referred to as the "forty thieves," Furthermore, the Sardauna of 
Sokoto, Sir Ahmadu Bello, recounted in 1926: 
Within sight of the school he could see the square 
fort and the sentries behind the parapets.... 
We did not like the soldiers; they were our own 
people and had conquered us for strangers and had 
defeated our people on the plain just before us. 
This feeling was very common all over the North.5 
2 
A. H. M. Kirk Green and S. C. Ulgrabi, Historical Society of 
Nigeria (Lagos: Onibonoje Printing Press, 1964), p. 80. 
3 
A. Haywood and F. A. S. Clarke, The History of the Royal West 
African Frontier Force (Aldershot: Gale and Pollen, 1964), p. 6. 
4 
V. A. Olorunsola, Soldiers and Power: The Development Performance 
of the Nigerian Military Regime (Standford: Hoover Institution Press, 
University of California, 1979), p. 18. 
^Sir Ahmadu Bello, My Life (Kaduna: Onibonyie Press, 1968), p. 67. 
-9- 
The soldiers' low rate of pay added to the army's minimal prestige. 
Mr. Enah, an ex-serviceman, told the parliament in 1963 that: 
People are jeered at when they want to join the army. 
The reason being that soldiers are treated no better 
than laborers There is a psychology in this 
country that when someone is badly paid that man is 
inferior.6 
Yet another source of the very humble but ill-fated beginning of 
the Nigerian army was the class from which they were drawn. Most often 
they were from illiterate classes enlisted from the more backward parts 
of the country. In 1963, an editorial comment appeared in the West 
African Pilot supporting this idea; it read: 
If the present state of affairs exists simply because 
our soldiers are drawn mainly from the illiterate 
class and do not compare favourable with their counter¬ 
parts in the outside world, then a case has been made 
for government to answer, but certainly on no account 
should soldiers be molested or abused. Such epithets 
as "afamako" and "abobaku," whatever they mean, must 
be stopped.' 
Promotion prospects were poor in the army in the beginning 
as compared to other segments in government service. Under 
the British army, Nigerian officers moved gradually up the normal 
ladder of promotion. For example, as N. J. Miners noted, it took 
two years for a soldier to move from the ranks of second lieutenant 
g 
to captain and seven years for him to move from captain to major." 
Under these circumstances, it became almost impossible to attract 
^Enah, West African Pilot, Vol. 372 (April 2, 1963), p. 16. 
7Ibid. 
O 
N. J. Miners, The Nigerian Army 1956-1966 (London: Methuen and 
Company, Ltd., 1969), p. 49. 
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educated people into the Nigerian army. 
By 1960, the Nigerian military forces were under the leadership 
of Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. During his administration a 
House of Representatives Select Committee was set up to survey the 
whole field of Nigerianization. Among other things, this committee 
recommended that the Nigerian army be completely managed by the Nigerian 
government instead of the War Office in Britain. Furthermore, it 
recommended the immediate displacement of senior expatriate officers 
on the grounds that their loyalities to Nigeria after independence 
would be divided. The acceptance of these recommendations by the 
government marked the beginning of the rise to prominence of the 
Nigerian army. 
Actions to increase the supply of potential officers were taken 
quickly on a number of lines. For example, there were greater efforts 
to publicize the army. Consequently, officers were sent to secondary 
schools to speak to students. Cadet units were established in some of 
the schools. Example of such were Kings College in Lagos, Government 
College in Zaria, Government College in Keffi, and at the Katsina 
Secondary School. In addition to this, some incentive programs were 
introduced; for example, the long standing complaints about car was 
solved by giving military officers car advance. Pension schemes were 
introduced. All secondary school students enlisted were sent to 
Sandhurst in England for training. And there was a considerable raise 
in the soldiers monthly salary. 
-11- 
By the end of 1960, the army was seen as a symbol of new national 
consciousness. This was further enhanced when later in the year, a 
battalion of the Nigerian army infantry division was sent to join the 
United Nations Peace Keeping Operation in Congo (Zaire). With this, 
the army had succeeded in changing the negative impressions that 
people had of them. Moreover, they had begun to symbolize the modern 
and technically efficient Nigerian army that was hoped for. 
Although this step had been accomplished, the army experienced 
many contradictions between 1964 and 1966. P. C. Lloyd, a prolific 
writer at the time, records that: 
Cohesive as the military elite may appear in contrast 
with other elite groups, it was not without its own 
divisions. Many of the junior officers were thus more 
highly educated with several of them university 
graduates. Their military training and promotion had 
been far more rapid as armies have grown in size, and 
been Aricanized, and they tend to be more radical than 
their superior officers.9 
The period between 1964 and 1966 not only revealed the tendencies 
of personality clashes, conflicting interests within the army, but, it 
also showed how the first civilian government unduly politicized and 
introduced the vices of tribalism and sectionalism into the otherwise 
neutral institution of the army. 
Thus, in the following paragraphs we shall examine the role of the 
weakness of the first civilian administration as a contributing factor 
to the growth of the Nigerian military in power politics. 
Q 
P. C. Lloyd, "Military Coups," Africa in Social Change (Middle¬ 
sex: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1967), p. 321. 
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Weakness of the First Republic 
Discussing military coups in Africa, P. C. Lloyd writes: 
The Nigerian Military Coup of January 1966 was the 
consequence of a complex situation in which most 
of the conflicts cited previously were represented. 
There has, however, been a tendency to ascribe it 
overwhelmingly to ethnic divisions in the country, 
at the expense of incipient class conflict.^ 
When Alhaji Muhammadu Ribadu took over as Minister of Defense on 
the attainment of independence in 1960, only sixty-one out of the 283 
military officers were Nigerians; at the time a lower proportion of 
Nigerians than in any other branch of the public service. Consequently, 
it would have been appropriate for Ribadu to implement the recommendations 
of the House of Representatives Select Committee on Nigerianization 
whose report had stressed the urgent need for complete Nigerianization 
of the entire army, especially at the top echelon. On the contrary, 
and in spite of the parliamentary pressure to accelerate this program, 
Ribadu made it clear that he was not going to be hurried. In fact, at 
one occasion, he told the House of Representative that: 
The motion underrates the difficulties, the qualifi¬ 
cations and experiences required for the efficient 
running of a modern army... I appeal to both sides 
of the House not to bring politics into the armed 
forces. Because one has a brother in the army he 
should not get up and say Nigerianize the armed 
forces.H 
Matters came to a head when the British head of the Nigerian army, 
Major General Foster was due to complete his service in March of 1962. 
10P. C. Lloyd, "Military Coups," Africa in Social Change (Middle¬ 
sex: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1967), p. 323. 
1 1 
House of Representatives Debate, Bill on Nigerianization, Vol. 
1257, April 11, 1961. 
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Naturally, Nigerians expected that the Minister would appoint a 
Nigerian to head the army. Instead, Minister Ribadu sent his Minister 
of State for the Army, Mr. Obande to London to interview a number of 
British officers who could be the successor of Major General Foster. 
This, as one could see, was sufficient to anger well-meaning Nigerians. 
A Nigerian newspaper, based in the Eastern Region of the country, The 
Nigerian Outlook, commented: 
Are we to believe that if either Lt. Col. Ironsi, 
or Lt. Col. Ademulegun was appointed to take over 
command of the Nigerian forces that Northern 
Nigeria would one day be invaded by the South? 
Or could it be inferred that since one of the 
most important ministeries, the Defense Ministry, 
is under the control of a Northerner, and perhaps 
there is no Northerner yet qualified to command 
the Nigerian forces then the post of commander 
must continue to be occupied by expatriates?^ 
In another instance, the Ministry of Defense was accused of 
introducing a regional quota system as a basis for enlistment into 
the army at officer cadet level. According to an article in the West 
African Pilot, 
The effect of the institution of regional quotas 
for officers was to send subgrade people for training 
merely to satisfy regional as opposed to national 
interests. 
A further example of the politicization of the army by Nigerian 
politicians occurred in 1964 when political disagreement arose between 
Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe and Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. In this particular 
instance, there was a general discontent with the figures published 
out of the 1963 general census. Both the NCNC (National Council of 
12 Editorial, The Nigerian Outlook (Enugu), February 23, 1962. 
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Nigerian Citizens) and Action Group Ministers headed by Dr. Nnamdi 
Azikiwe had alleged that the published figures were fabricated in 
favor of the Northern region; while the NNDP (Nigerian National 
Democratic Party) headed by Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa 
claimed that they were authentic figures which should be accepted by 
the opposing ministers. In the disagreement that ensued Tafawa 
Balewa was quoted as saying: 
The NCNC Federal Ministers should accept the figures 
or resign. My acceptance and publication of the 
census figures is final. My people, my government, 
and my party are fully prepared at any hour of the ,, 
day for any eventuality and would meet any challenge." 
Similarly, Dr. Azikiwe had taken a bold step and had summoned the 
commandants of the police, Army and Navy to State House and declared 
that "in view of the present crisis he proposed to take control and 
asked for their support on the grounds that he was both President 
14 and their Commander-in-Chief." 
When this crisis ended in 1965, the expatriate Head of the 
Nigerian army, Major General Imelby-Everard had to be replaced by a 
Nigerian when he completed his tenure of office. Four brigadiers 
who had grown together through the rank and file were possible 
candidates. Aguiyi Ironsi was one; others were Ademulegun, Ogundipe 
and Maimalari. It was Aguiyi Ironsi who was appointed to succeed the 
13 
J. 0. Ojiako, Nigeria: Yesterday, Today and  ? (Onisha: 
Africana Educational Publishers (Nig.), Ltd., 1981), p. 177. 
^Okion Ojigbo, "The First Republic," Nigeria Returns to Civilian 
Rule (Lagos: Tokion (Nig) Company, 1980), p. 23. 
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outgoing Head of the Army. The political implication of this 
appointment was brought out in the open when Dr. Mbadiwe described 
how Brigadier Aguiyi Ironsi was chosen for the post. In his obituary 
tribute to Muhammadu Ribadu, he said: 
"Ribadu had an unshakable belief in the unity of this 
country. Never before had the cause of Nigerian 
unity been so shaken as during that crisis  
Tribalism and separatism featured their worst 
form.... Despite all the rumors, gossips, under¬ 
currents, and evil machinations, Ribadu came out 
in that heat to recommend to the Prime Minister 
the appointment of Aguiyi Ironsi as the Officer 
commanding the Nigerian army."15 
Thus, the appointment of Ironsi was not only an acknowledgement 
of his long standing seniority in the army, but a political gesture of 
conciliation and a calculated package to resolve the 1964-65 crisis. 
Not finished, during the Western Region election crisis of 1965, 
the federal government declared a state of emergency in the Region and 
ordered soldiers stationed there to maintain peace. 
These unfortunate incidents tending towards national disaster 
were not seen by soldiers alone. The intellectual elite were most 
disturbed by it. For example, Chinua Achebe wrote a satirical novel 
titled A Man of the People. In this novel, he describes the last days 
of a corrupt West African government which ended with the military tak¬ 
ing over to cleanse the country. Dr. Obarogie Ohonbamu, a law lecturer 
at the University of Lagos also published a pamphlet titled Nigeria, 
the Army and the Peoples' Cause. 
15 Okion Ojigbo, "The First Republic," Nigeria Returns to Civilian 
Rule (Lagos: Tokin (Nig) Company, 1980), p. 83. 
160. Ohonbamu, Nigeria, the Army and the Peoples' Cause (Ibadan: 
Africana Educational Press, 1965). 
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In view of the above, and realizing the fact that soldiers were 
constantly being invited to perform police duties plus their being 
aware of their growing importance in the Nigerian body politic, some 
military personnel felt it was inevitable that the survival of the 
existing structure of Nigeria depended on them. The first known 
political intriqués within the army occurred at this time when 
Lt. Col. Odumegwu Ojukwu and other headquarters officers of the same 
rank were involved in canvassing about an army intervention. On 
January 15, 1966, the Nigerian Army staged a successful bloody coup thus 
bringing them to prominence. 
In this final part of chapter one, we shall look beyond the 
internal contradictions of Nigeria power politics to determine whether 
the frequent coups which had beset many African nations between 1960 
and 1969 served as a catalyst in the sudden bloody coup which brought 
the Nigerian Army to power in 1966. 
Influence of the Decade of Military Coups in Africa 
A field study tour of African countries reveals that the continent 
experienced varying coups in the ten years preceding 1960, a decade 
which had boosted African independence from her colonialists. For 
example, at the beginning of 1960, the mutiny of the force publique in 
Congo had taken place. In December of the same year, the imperial 
guard in Ethiopia made an attempt to overthrow Emperor Hailie-Selassie. 
By 1963, coups in Togo, Congo (Zaire) and Dahomey (Benin) had become 
a rea 1 i ty. 
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This brings us to the important question, what factor affected 
the timing of these coups? 
The answer is not far fetched. Within a few years after 
independence, schisms, corruption and economic malaise came to a head 
among prominent politicians, thus weakening the broadly based nationalist 
movements. Since the above anomalies were unique to the African states, 
the intervention of the Army was a possibility, and as soon as this 
took place in one country, it became contagious. This contagious 
assumption is validated with an extract from Colonel David Thompson's 
statement, immediately on his arrest for plotting to overthrow the 
government of Liberia in 1963. He is noted to have said that: 
If only 250 Togolese soldiers could overthrow their 
government, a Liberian Army of 50,000 could seize 
power easily.17 
Also, Claude Welch, in his Soldiers and State in Africa, argues 
that successful seizure of power in one state touches off a series of 
coups in the continent. He corroborates this by asserting that "the 
Zanzibar uprising helped to trigger off the East African Mutinies," 
and went further to conclude that "the intervention of Col. Christophe 
Soglo of Dahomey in December 1965 helped to touch off coups in Central 
19 African Republic, Upper Volta and Nigeria." 
^Helen Kitchen, "Filling the Togo Vaccum," African Report, 
Vol. VIII (January 2, 1963), p. 9. 
1 Q 
Claude E. Welch, "Soldier and State in Africa," Governing in 
Black Africa, Perspective on New States. (Marion E. Doro and Newell 
M. Stultz Company, 1970), p. 157. 
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Based on these instances, it becomes logical to accept the facts 
that while the internal conflict within the Nigerian Army and political 
arena contributed a great deal to military intervention, it would also 
be appropriate to know that during the period 1960-1970 the continent 
was beset by a series of coups; additionally, that such could not be 
exonerated as a contributing factor in the military's rise to power 
politics in Nigeria in 1966. 
CHAPTER II 
THE PERFORMANCE OF THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT 
UNDER GENERAL YAKUBU GOWON 
In this chapter, an indepth examination is done in the performance 
of the Gowon Administration. This chapter is very important in the 
thesis because it provides the reader with background information 
regarding the root cause and exigences of the events that led to the 
final collapse of the administration under study. 
A brief introduction and critique is given about the situation in 
the country before the advent of the regime of General Yakubu Gowon. 
This background is followed by a detailed study of his performance in 
the specific areas of national unity, management of the Nigerian Civil 
War, international relations and in economic development efforts. 
As discussed earlier, our study and analysis of the performance 
of the government in question will be perplexing without a brief 
reflection on the exigencies of the first government whose demise 
brought the very government under examination to power. The first 
Military Government inherited many controversial problems that emanated 
from the poor administration of the first civilian administration. Some 
of the problems included: Regions wanting to break away from the 
nation, widespread corruption, a politics of ideological and personal 
differences among peoples of the country, growing frustration among 
soldiers, and an overall discontent regarding the existing political 
situation of the nation. It was the combination of these factors that 
-19- 
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prompted the January 15th coup of 1966 which brought Major General 
Aguiyi Ironsi to power. 
Contrary to what one might imagine, this coup which was over¬ 
whelmingly accepted at the beginning, turned out to be, as the British 
Broadcasting Corporation announced, "an Ibo power play to smash the 
1 q 
Northern grip on the country." 
This was proven to be true when a list released by the Punch 
newspaper showed that no top prominent politician of Ibo origin (Eastern 
Region) was killed during the January 15, 1966 coup. Also, another list 
of the coup plotters revealed that apart from Major Ademoyega, all 
others were Ibos. Among those included were Major C. K. Nzeogwu, 
Major E. Ifejuna, Major D. Okafor, Captain E.N. Nwobosi and 2nd Lt. 
Odumegwu Ojukwu. However, there were those who argued contrarywise, 
one of such was Major C. K. Nzeogwu who, commenting on the reason that 
led to the military take over, said: 
We seized power to stamp out tribalism, nepotism 
and regionalism... it was a truly Nigerian gathering 
and only in the army do you get true Nigerianism. 
They did it for the good of their country... we all 
started out in the same spirit but... 20 
While the B.B.C. announcement did more harm than good in establishing 
the credibility of the Ironsi Government, Major General Ironsi took some 
administrative steps which made his government short-lived. For 
example, he opted for centralization of democratic power through 
^J. 0. Okiako, Thirteen Years of Military Rule 1966-1979 (Lagos: 
Daily Times Press, 1979), p. 33. 
20 
C. K. Nzeogwu, "Why the Army Took Over the Government," Thirteen 
Years of Military Rule 1966-1979 (Lagos: Daily Times Press, 1979), p. 2. 
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unitarism. This was given political expression in 1966 in Decree 
No. 34. The decree states that: 
Nigerian shall on the twenty-fourth of May 1966 
cease to be a Federation, and shall accordingly 
as from that day be a Republic by the name of 
Republic of Nigeria, consisting of the whole 
territory which immediately before that day was 
comprised of a Federation. 21 
Secondly, in Decree No. 1 of 1966, he abolished the Constitution and 
regional autonomy and imposed a centralized decision-making process 
by arrogating to the Federal Government 
...the power to make plans for the peace, order 
and good government of Nigeria or any part thereof, 
with respect to any matter whatsoever.22 
Within the Military Force, the 
...Ironsi Administration was threatened on two 
sides. On one side there were supporters of 
Major Nzeogwu, who believed that Ironsi had aborted 
the true birth of the Revolution by his actions on 
15th January 1966 when he gained control of Lagos. 
On another side there were Northern soldiers who 
were furious at the murder of the senior Northern 
officers in the Army. These soldiers were ready 
to take the law into their hands.23 
Under these circumstances, the government of Major General Aguiyi 
Ironsi was ephemeral. His idea of unitarism was vehemently resented 
by many Nigerians. Riots ensued in the Northern cities with demon¬ 
strators calling for a referendum on the decree. According to Nwankwo 
and Ifejika: 
^J.O. Okiako, Thirteen Years of Military Rule 1966-1979 (Lagos: 
Daily Times Press, 1979), p. 18. 
2? ^Ibid., p. 7. 
23 
N. J. Miners, "Unrest in the Army," The Nigerian Army 1956-1966 
(London: Methuen and Company, Ltd., 1967). 
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...riots ensued in the Northern cities, and quickly 
became a progrom against Ibo sectors of Northern 
cities where an estimated three thousand were killed.24 
This uncertainty and hostility continued until the early hours of 
July 29, 1966 when Vakubu Gowon entered the political picture. 
Having examined in a nutshell the issues that led the July 29, 
1966 coup, we shall now proceed to examine the achievements of the 
Gowon Administration. Emphasis is, however, given on some specific 
achievements of the government. Each of the cases selected seemed in 
a special way significant, if nothing more than for the fact that it 
tends to emphasize the unique nature of the particular situation. 
In this chapter our main focus shall be on the examination of 
his achievements in the area of national unity, the management of the 
Nigerian Civil War, Nigerian relations and economic development efforts. 
National Unity 
Gowon's first address to the nation was made within forty-eight 
hours of his assuming the Office of Head of State. In the address 
which was greatly admired by the masses, he restored the Federal system 
which had been reversed to unitary system of government by Major General 
Ironsi. 
In addition, in the anxious days of 1966 when Nigerians were 
skeptical of his ability to control the unpredictable political 
situation in the country, General Gowon displayed little of the indecision 
24 
F. Nwankwo and 0. Ifejika,The Making of a Nation Biafra (Atsa: 
Goldon Star Printing Press, 1979), p. 168. 
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which was a characteristic of the previous administrations. Although 
no definite time table was set, by August 8th, he had announced plans 
for military disengagement. He went further to call a national 
conference to discuss Nigeria's future form of government. In Gowon's 
point of view, the aim of the conference should be: 
...to find formula for continued association of 
Nigeria's four Regions which will not jeopardize 
our children's chances of building a great African 
nation that can command the respect of the whole 
world.25 
Another major achievement of the Gowon Administration towards a 
united Nigeria, was the abolition of the four regions and the creation 
of a twelve state structure. Prior to this time, prominent Nigerian 
politicians like Chief Awolowo, Chief Anthony Enahoro and Chief (Dr.) 
Nnamdi Azikiwe had all suggested the creation of more states in Nigeria. 
Generally, the suggestions for more states in the country had been 
justified on one or more of the three grounds: 
(a) The need for government to be nearer the people; 
(b) The need for unity in the country; and 
Of 
(c) The need to minimize conflict between states and within states. 
One of the main reasons for the division of Nigeria into smaller 
states as opposed to four large regions has been the need to attain 
national unity which had been a major problem facing the country before 
2 5 A. H. M. Kirk-Green, Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria, A Documentary 
Sourcebook 1966-1969, Vol. I (London: Oxford University Press, 197 
p. 136. 
J. M. Ostheimer, "Nigerian Military Government Since 1966," 
Nigerian Politics (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), p. 63. 
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General Yakubu Gowon became the Head of State. For instance, Dr. Nnamdi 
Azikiwe once noted that: 
In order to evolve into a near perfect union, the 
whole of Nigeria should be divided and so demarcated 
geographically and demographically that no one region 
would be in a position to dominate the rest.27 
And Obafemi Awolowo was noted to have also written that: 
The evils which afflicted Nigeria and brought the 
ruin of the first Republic may be put in a nutshell 
as follows, abnormal imbalance in the constituents 
of the Federation.28 
Thus, when the twelve states were created in 1967, it was explained 
that the exercise was guided by the need to achieve unity and stability 
in Nigeria. This almost meant that the secession bid by the old regions 
would be discouraged. It further implied that: 
(a) Legislation would not go against the wishes of any part; 
(b) Economic development of all parts is encouraged so that no 
area feels neglected; 
(c) Every part is adequately represented and protected; and 
(d) Every part has equal opportunity of participation in the 
political process. 
Another rationale behind the creation of the twelve states had 
been the need to minimize or completely eliminate both intra and 
interstate conflicts. This is because the major feature of the old 
regions and states was the actual or potential development of conflict 
in many of them. Over time there had been cases of interstate conflicts 
27 N. Azikiwe, "Essentials for Nigerian Survival," Foreign Affairs, 
Vol. XLIII (1964-65), p. 447. 
28 O. Awolowo, Thoughts on Nigerian Constitution (Ibadan: University 
Press, 1969), p. 66. 
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arising from states demanding to include the people of another state. 
The main cause here was the fact that the interstate boundaries split 
many cultural groups making them minorities in different regions. 
Examples of these were: 
(a) The Ijaw Tribe which was split between Mid-Western and 
Eastern Region. In the state structure this was passed 
to the Rivers State; and 
(b) The Yoruba in Ilorin and Kabba division, which formed a 
significant minority in the Western and Northern Regions 
respectively were carved out as a single state called 
Kwara State. 
For more understanding of this problem, I have provided two maps, 
Figure I and II. The maps show the Nigerian regional structure and 
the new state structure created by General Yakubu Gowon, respectively. 
Finally, the creation of twelve states in Nigeria helped in the 
greater sharing of federal government resources. The desire for greater 
opportunities for cultural development arose out of the fact that each 
of the regions comprised of many ethnic nations and cultural units. 
It was felt that such composition did not allow all ethnic nations 
full opportunities for the development of their culture. This was 
particularly the case with the three older regions in which one ethnic 
nation formed more than fifty percent of the population while there 
were other large groups within each of them. See Table I below. 
With the below table, it becomes clear that the twelve states 
created by Gowon in 1967 achieved the following points which further 
served as the basis for national unity. 
1. Nearness of government to the people. 
2. Minimized interstate and intra-state conflicts. 
26 
FIGURE I 
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TABLE I 
NIGERIA ETHNIC STRUCTURE OF PRE-1963 REGIONS 






















Igbo (Ibo) 7,991 64.5 Hausa Fulani 16,318 54.7 Yoruba 9,777 76.4 
Ibibio 2,806 22.6 Kanuri 2,258 7.6 Edo 1,704 13.3 
E. Ijaw 1,072 Tiv 1,374 4.6 Ijaw 263 6.4 
Ekoi 343 2.8 Yoruba 1,144 3.8 Ibo 821 2.1 
Others 183 1.47 Nupe 648 2.2 Others 236 1.8 
Others 8,066 27.1 
Source: "Minutes of the Minorities Commission Sitting at Benin City," 
Daily Times, October 3, 1974, p. 5. 
3. Solved the fear of domination which the smaller regions 
have always had against the larger regions. 
4. It furthered the assurance of economic development of all 
parts of the nation because of the new economic and political 
diversification created by the new twelve state structure. 
Another noteworthy program of the Gowon Administration for realizing 
national unity was the National Youth Service Corps Program. This 
program, which came into effect by Decree No. 24 began on May 22, 1973, 
had among other things, some of the following objectives. 
1. To develop common ties among Nigerian youths and promote 
national unity. 
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2. To encourage members of the Service Corps to seek at the 
end of their Corps Service career employment all over the 
country, thus promoting the free movement of labor. 
There is much argument to suggest that the NYSC scheme had actually 
achieved the National Unity for which it was designed. Ejike Ofoegbu, 
in his contributing article to Kwara State NYSC 1979/80 Magazine, said: 
The NYSC has succeeded in congregating youths from 
different political, geographical, linguistic and 
socio-cultural backgrounds. Their interaction in 
the orientation camps (via drills, sports, lectures, 
debates, drama, cross-pollination of ideas, etc.) 
and exposure to other people during their primary 
and secondary assignments have contributed in no 
small way in demolishing the banners of prejudice, 
promotion of friendship, national unity and under¬ 
standing.29 
Management of the Nigerian Civil War 
As we noted earlier, the leadership style of Aguiyi Ironsi, the 
killing of the Northern, Western, and Mid-Western Regions prominent 
politicians without similar action in the Eastern Region by the coup 
which brought him to power plus the growing conception that the coup 
was an Ibo power play to smash the Northern grip on the country; all 
led to the revolt and hostilities in the Northern cities, resulting 
in the mass killing of Ibos. It was also what led to the coup of 
July 29, 1966 which brought Gowon to power. As the situation worsened, 
the Ibos decided on seccession from Nigeria to form the Republic of 
Biafra. It was Gowon's attempt to reintegrate the Ibos into the Nigerian 
state that led to the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970. Hence, although 
29 
Ejike Ofoegbu, "The NYSC and the Second Republic," Kwara NYSC 
1979/80 Annual Magazine (1980), p. 28. 
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the subsequent July 29th coup of General Yakubu Gowon made all efforts 
to ensure that Nigerians bury their hatchets, it failed to establish 
the much needed central authority of the Federal Government over 
Eastern states. This section of the country became quite autonomous 
in its relation with the Federal Government. Several attempts were 
made to reconcile both parties by prominent Nigerian politicians and 
friendly African states. An example of such a peace move was Aburi 
Peace Talks engineered by General Ankrah of Ghana on July 4, 1967. 
General Ankrah had said Ghana could not sit back while Nigeria burned. 
Consequently, he regarded the Aburi Peace Talks as "a round table 
30 discussion in which there was no head or tail." 
Nevertheless, the Aburi Peace Talks yielded no positive results. 
By May 30, 1967, Col. Odumegwu Ojukwu had proclaimed the independent 
Republic of Biafra, 
...on the ground that the people of Eastern Nigeria 
believed that they could no longer be protected in 
their lives and property by any government based 
outside Eastern Nigeria.31 
In response to the declaration of secession, General Yakubu Gowon 
had taken it lightly and was ready to talk things over with Col. Ojukwu. 
When these attempts failed, General Gowon pledged to "crush the 
32 
rebellion." The result was the civil war which lasted from July 6, 
30 
General Ankrah, Welcome Address, Aburi Conference Ghana: 
January 4, 1967. 
31J. Ojiako, "1967 Nigeria's Agonising Year," Thirteen Years of 
Military Rule 1966-1979 (Lagos: Daily Times Press, 1979), p. 48. 
32Ibid., p. 52. 
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1967 to January 12, 1970. 
One year after the war had started, Gowon was still ready for 
negotiations with the rebels to maintain a united Nigeria. In a press 
conference held on January 5, 1968 at Dodan Barracks, Gowon said: 
Seventeen leading people would be totally acceptable 
to the Federal Government for talks. We believe with 
such men who would discuss in good faith, an agreement 
and effective arrangements could be negotiated to 
ensure that territorial integrity of Nigeria is 
preserved while the safety and livelihood of all 
citizens are guaranteed. 33 
General Yakubu Gowon is noted to have attended most of the OAU's 
Consultative Committee Meetings to seek a solution to the Nigerian 
Civil War. In one of such meetings held at Niamey, Niger Republic, 
General Gowon was quoted as saying: 
If the secessionist leaders continued to refuse 
to come to the conference table, the Federal 
Government will have no choice but to take over 
the remaining rebel-held areas. 34 
Yet Gowon's open-mindedness was revealed at his acceptance of the 
Ibos at the end of the Civil War. In his Midnight Radio Broadcast 
accepting the surrender of Ibos, he said: 
We have arrived at one of the greatest moments 
of the history in our nation. A great moment of 
victory for national unity and reconciliation. 
We have arrived at the end of a tragic and painful 
conflict. Thirty months ago we were obliged to 
take up arms against our brothers who were deceived 
and misled into armed rebellion against their 
33 General Yakubu Gowon, Press Conference at Dodan Barracks, 
January 5, 1968. 
34General Yakubu Gowon, Radio Broadcast to the Nation, January 12, 
1970. 
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fatherland by the former Lt. Col. Ojukwu. Our 
objective was to crush the rebellion to main¬ 
tain the territorial integrity of our nation, 
to assert the ability of the blackman, to build 
a strong, progressive and prosperous modern 
state and to ensure respect, dignity and 
equality in the community of nations for our 
prosperity. Fellow countrymen, with your 
continued loyalty and dedication to the national 
course, we shall succeed in healing the nation's 
wounds. We must all welcome with open arms the 
people now freed from the tyranny and deceit of 
Ojukwu and his gang. 35 
This announcement was followed immediately with the efforts on 
reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction which were aimed at 
reintegrating the ex-Biafrans into the Nigerian body politic. 
Further, he extended an open has by hiring Ibos as his body guards 
and pilots. M. F. Gutteridge records that: 
Not only were former opponents treated with 
magnanimity, but he did not preclude the develop¬ 
ment of trust and loyalty on a personal level, 
his employment of Ibo pilots for his own plane 
might well have seemed foolhardy to some.36 
Economic Development Efforts 
For our understanding of Nigerian economic development efforts 
during the period under study, it is proper to first of all look at the 
nature of her economy between 1960 and 1966. 
This period shows that Nigeria practiced an agrarian economy with 
foreign trade earnings principally from cocoa, palm produce and groundnuts. 
35 General Yakubu Gowon, Radio Broadcast to the Nation, January 12, 
1970. 
W. F. Gutteridge, Military Regimes in Africa (London: Methuen 
and Company, Ltd., 1976), p. 134. 
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Data on occupation also showed a pattern that higher percentage of 
the Nigerian labor force was in the agriculture sector (see Figure III). 
Two characteristics were predominant in the Nigerian economy 
during the time under study. One was the heavy reliance on foreign 
earnings from agricultural products to the neglect or emphasis in 
manufacturing, mining, and production. Natziger attributes this to: 
The colonial administrators whose early economic 
plan for the nation was to prepare it as an economy 
open to foreign trade and investment and a substan¬ 
tial reliance on overseas assistance.37 
The other characteristic was the advanced form of interregional trade 
which had developed in the country. According to Alan Hay and Robert 
Smith the major factors making for the high volume of interregional 
trade in Nigeria, especially in local foodstuffs were: 
(a) The regional variation in natural resources which result 
in scarcity or abundance of productive factors in some regions 
(b) The considerable ecological differences between the 
Northern savanna and Southern coastal forest plus the 
uneven distribution of natural resources.38 
The interregional movement of the economic goods were as follows: 
timber from the tropical hardwoods of the Southern forest belt was in 
great demand in the Northern region for the construction of houses. 
Coal mined in the Eastern Region was used throughout the country for 
fire and energy, while cocoa from the Western Region provided raw materials 
37 
E. W. Natziger, African Capitalism: A Case Study on Nigerian 
Entrepreneurship (Stanford: Hoover Institute Press, 1977), p. 67. 
OO 
Alan Hay and Robert H. T. Smith, "Interregional Trade and Money 
Flows in Nigeria," The Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic 
Research (Ibadan: University Press, 1970), p. 10. 
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TABLE II 
CHART SHOWING NIGERIA LABOR DISTRIBUTION IN 1963 
Occupation Number Percentage of 
000 Labor Force 
1. Professional, Technical 
Related 441 2.41 
2. Administrative, Executive, 
Managerial 39 0.21 
3. Clerical 228 1.25 
4. Sales 2,806 15.33 
5. Agriculture 10,201 55.73 
6. Mines, Quarry 14 0.08 
7. Laborers, Crafts 2,190 11.96 
8. Service, Sports 
and Recreation 871 4.76 
9. Others 891 4.87 
0. Unemployed 345 1.88 
Source: Office of Statistics, Population Census of Nigeria (Lagos: 
Ministry of Statistics, 1963), pp. 39-40. 
for the Northern Region's factories. Figure III shows how these movements 
took place. 
Table II dramatizes the role of the exchange of commodities ir, the 
interregional trade economic structure. It also dramatizes the role 
of the North as a net exporter to all regions and that of Mid-West 
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FIGURE III 
CHART SHOWING NIGERIAN INTER-TRADE COMMODITIES 
TRADE EXCHANGES AMONG PRE-1967 REGIONS 
£f\ST 
Source: Abner Cohen, "The Social Organization of Credit in a West 
African Cattle Market," Africa, Vol. XXXV, No. 12 
(January 1965), p. 14. 
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(Bendel) as a net importer. Each of the other regions had two import 
and export surpluses. 
With the coming of military under Gowon's Administration, a more 
dynamic step was taken to boost the country's economy. The economic 
strength was shifted away from interest groups in the regions, including 
merchants and medium-sized industrialists, to those at the center such 
as government servants, and the high level personnel in the large 
39 public corporations. 
The reason for this sudden shift was because the civil service 
machinery reflected the principles of federal supremacy. In addition, 
Gowon's government was interested in creating career positions in the 
Government Service; and in pursuit of this objective the bureaucracy 
was being filled with Nigerian citizens who had graduated from the 
universities, polytechnics and colleges of technology. Olatunde Ojo 
in Federal-State Relations 1967-1974 argued that: 
The new government set up was a source of new 
opportunities for advancement as well as a means 
of undermining the power of encrusted traditional 
authorities, and thus of accelerating the process 
of development. 40 
Above all this, the new move was an attempt to introduce Nigerians to 
the socioeconomic policy-making process of the country. Before the 
Army took over the reign of political affairs, the civilians were 
39 
B. J. Dudley, "The Military and Development." Nigerian Journal 
of Economic and Social Studies, XIII, No. 2 (July 2, 1971 ). 
^°01atunde J. B. Ojo, "Federal-State Relations 1967-1974," 
Quarterly Journal of Administration, Vol. 10, (January 1976), p. 111. 
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contented with the subordinate relationship they had with the former 
Colonial masters who in fact formulated policies for the Government. 
Hence, an odd situation which made the leaders ignorant about the 
direction the country was heading towards. Wayne Natziger noted that: 
The dominant class, virtually devoid of goals 
and priorities that could be articulated to the 
masses and preoccupied with the preservation of 
their system of patronage did not encourage 
decision making by local authorities or consulta¬ 
tion with the public. Members of parliament 
energetically pushed projects that would enhance 
their clientage base regardless of any relation¬ 
ship to the plains objective. The decision on 
expenditures involving millions of pounds were 
made on the basis of conversations between 
politicians and expertraites without documents 
or experts advice and with little assertainable 
facts. The parliament was not equipped and did 
not have the will to make important decisions 
concerning the plan because of a preoccupation 
with the distribution of bounty to the faithful. 41 
It was this group of indigenous economists, planners and bureaucrats, 
with good educational and professional backgrounds, who drew up the 
second National Development Plan of 1970-74 which was to be the corner¬ 
stone of the economic structure upon which the Nigerian economic 
successess would rest. Such instances are: 
(1) Under this plan, the petroleum which was long discovered 
but unexploited by the previous administrations was given adequate 
attention. Petroleum in no time took the lead in Nigeria's foreign 
exchange earnings, and by 1976 had become the largest component of 
^Wayne Nafziger, African Capitalism: A Case Study in Nigerian 
Entrepreneurship (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1977), p. 67. 
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the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). As the economic indices below depict, 
the oil which contributed only 25.9 percent to the Gross Revenue in 
1970-71 progressively contributed 67.3 percent in 1974 and 80.80 
percent by 1975. 
TABLE III 
SELECTED ECONOMIC INDICES OF NIGERIA 










as % Total 
Revenue 
1970-71 758.1 755.80 196.4 25.9 
1971-72 1,410.9 1,084.33 740.1 52.5 
1972-73 1.389.9 1,067.56 576.2 41.5 
1973-74 2,171.3 1,733.84 1,461.6 67.3 
1974-75 5,177.1 4,076.98 4,183.8 80.80 
1975-76 5,861.6 4,026.15 4,611.7 73.7 
1976-77 7,070.3 5,040.89 5,548.5 78.5 
1977-78 8,251.2 5,574.12 5,821.48 70.6 
1978-79 6,815.2 4,443.46 4,249.23 62.3 
1979-80 8,805.3 6,271.12 7,350.3 
Source: Federal Ministry of Finance, Statistics Division (Lagos: 1980). 
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(2) To ensure even economic development, the government decided 
to organize agencies which experts regarded as "more important 
foundation stone" in developing the Nigerian economy. Some of such 
agencies were: 
Nigeria Agricultural Bank (1973) - The long-term objective of the 
NAB set up in 1973 was, according to Gowon: 
...to provide credit and loans for development 
and thereby enhance the level and quality of 
agricultural production including the following: 
horticulture, poultry, farming, pig breeding, 
fisheries, forestry and timber production. The 
aim of the bank is to improve rural life and the 
agricultural economy of the country by boosting 
income and purchasing power to the rural popula¬ 
tion. 42 
Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry (1973) - The principal 
function of the NBCI includes the provision of equity capital and funds 
by way of loans to indigenous persons, institutions and organizations 
for medium and long-term investments in industry and commerce of 
Nigeria. 
The Nigerian Standard Organization (1971) - This was established 
under Decree No. 56 of 1971 and its functions were to standardize methods 
and products in industries in Nigeria and to ensure Federal State 
Government compliance with national policy on standardization. 
Industrial Research Council of Nigeria - This council was 
established in 1971 and affiliated to the Federal Ministry of Industries. 
The principal functions of the council among other things, are to carry 
42 
Panther Bricks, Soldiers and Oil, the Transformation of Nigeria 
(London: Frank, Cass and Company, Ltd., 1979), p. 25. 
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out research activities in Nigeria and to develop and apply such 
industrial research results to the nation's needs. 
Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Board (1972) - This Board governs 
the Nigeria Indigenization decree program. Its main functions as 
specified under Section 4(2) of Decree No. 4 of February 1972 is to 
advance and develop the promotion of enterprises in which citizens of 
Nigeria should participate fully and play a dominant role. 
Since all the economic policies and decrees enumerated above were 
formulated with a view of ensuring that the Nigerian economy and 
subsequent development is absolutely controlled by Nigerians themselves, 
it will be worthwhile that we devote this part of the chapter to examining 
the degree of success brought about by their very creation. 
The need for economic self-reliance was taken more seriously by 
the Federal Military Government immediately after the civil war after 
Government had experienced the consequences of excessive reliance on 
foreign governments and on transnational corporations. For example, 
the indecision of transnational oil companies about whether to make pay¬ 
ments to the Federal Government of Nigeria or the Biafran Government 
had some impact on the thinking of the military rulers and this created 
serious doubts as to whether the transnational business community in 
Nigeria could be trusted or not. Another source of this decision was 
the direct impact the civil war had on Nigerian businessmen. The war 
had fostered the rise of a new bourgeoisie who accumulated easy wealth 
by supplying equipment, food and war material to either the Biafran 
or the Federal Government's side of the civil war. Since these new 
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bourgeoisie did not own its wealth to the assistance of foreigners 
(transnational companies), it began to see the latter as competing, and 
thus put pressure on the Government to Nigerianize the economy. Alhaji 
Aminu Dantata, Kano State Commissioners for Trade and Industry noted 
in 1972, "by promulgating the decree, the Federal Government has done 
what businessmen themselves wanted so badly for several years past." 
In the same view, P. C. Asiodu, former Minister of Mines and Power 
noted that "it was in the period between 1968 and 1971 that the widest 
consultations were undertaken leading to the promulgation of the 
Enterprises Promotion Decrees of 1972. Hence, despite the firsthand 
experience of the military rulers, the influence of these pressures 
from Nigerian bourgoisie increased the distrust of foreign investors 
in Nigeria. This was what led to the promulgation of the Nigerian 
Enterprises Promotion Decree in 1972. The central objective being 
"to obtain Nigerian control over her economy in general and over 
43 strategic enterprises in particular. 
According to the framers of the decree, it was stipulated that by 
March 1974, no person other than a Nigerian citizen could be the owner 
or part owner of enterprises in twenty-two selected industries in Nigeria 
(called Schedule I Industries). Industries classified in this schedule 
were the small, labor intensive manufacturing and service related 
businesses. The decree further provided (Schedule II), in which aliens 
43 Thomas J. Biersteker, "Indigenization in Nigeria: Renationalization 
or Denationalization?" The Political Economy of Nigeria ed. William 
Zartman (New York: Praeger Publisher Company, 1963), p. 188. 
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were not allowed to participate in industries in which the paid-up 
share capital was less than 200,000 dollars or the turnover of the 
enterprises was less than 500,000 dollars, whichever the Nigerian 
enterprises promotion Board deemed appropriate. However, companies 
exempted from these provisions were required to make available to the 
Nigerian public forty percent of the total equity capital (Phase I) 
and sixty percent (Phase II). 
Forward looking as these programs may seem, evidence reveal that 
since promulgation the programs, especially the Indigenization Decree, 
have suffered some serious set back. So many reasons account for this. 
In a survey carried out by the Federal Ministry of Information to 
determine the extent of implementation it was discovered that: 
(a) Some Nigerians collaborate with foreign investors to be 
used as "front" in the directorship of the establishment 
of enterprises solely intended for Nigerian citizens; 
(b) The transnational companies are still able to maintain 
control over the Nigerian economic operations by entering 
into technical service agreement with Nigerian "directors" 
or "partners" that they (transnational corporations) be 
vested with the responsibility of providing technology, 
maintenance and innovation; 
(c) By negotiating exemption from the Indigenization Decree 
with the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Cooperatives; 
(d) By bribing the government officials who are expected to 
implement the indigenization program; and 
(e) By appointing people of different tribes as Board of Directors 
with a view of "playing Hausas and Yoruba's against each 
other with the hope that disruption between them will 
distract them (Nigerian Board members) from trying to manage 
the company.44 
^Thomas J. Biersteker, "Indigenization in Nigeria: Renationalization 
or Denationalization?" The Political Economy of Nigeria ed. William 
Zartman (New York: Praeger Publisher Company, 1983), p. 199. 
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Nevertheless, the programs have also been noted to have brought about 
good economic findings. 
The fact that every subsequent government, since the overthrow of 
Gowon, seek to accept the programs and promulgate additional measures 
to ensure its success goes to mean that the programs are already a 
success by its own right. In fact, the Murtala Mohammed/Obasanjo 
Military Government improved on the programs by adding in 1977 that: 
"...the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree are 
to advance and promote enterprises in which citizens 
of Nigeria shall participate fully and play a 
dominant role as well as ensuring the assumption 
of the control of the Nigerian economy by Nigerians 
in the shortest possible time."45 
In addition, since the promulgation of the decree, the Nigerian 
bourgeoisie is constantly being informed of his role as a final writer in 
the Nigerian economy. 
Similarly, although the Nigeria Agricultural Bank, Nigerian Bank 
for Commerce and Industry and Industrial Research Council of Nigeria 
were established with the good faith of serving as a basis for sound 
industrial take-off, bureaucratic redtapism, lack of patronage by the 
people they were designed for and the inability of the Government to 
discipline its Nigerian bourgeoisie, have rendered the programs 
seemingly ineffective. For example, the peasant and petty traders 
for whose purpose the Nigerian Agricultural Bank and Nigerian Bank for 
Commerce and Industry were created are often denied loans because they 
Federal Government Gazette, Federal Ministry of Information, 
June 1977, p. A19. 
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are hardly able to meet the dilaterai security demanded by the officials 
of these banks. While the businessmen who qualify for the loans are 
not monitored by either the banks or Government to ensure that loans 
obtained from the Government agencies are used for the purposes for 
which they were designed. 
Furthermore, the lack of willingness by the Nigerian bourgeoisie 
to engage in long-term production or manufacturing activities have been 
the major problem facing the Industrial Research Council of Nigeria 
who have time and again complained that the inventions of the council 
are not being commercialized by the Nigerian businessmen. 
All these facts therefore point to the direction that while the 
economic programs laid down by General Yakubu Gowon are laudable 
the role of the Nigerian investors whose duty it is to take advantage 
of the agencies served to hinder the success of the programs. 
These development programs were based on the money from the oil 
boom which at the time seemed unending. Consequently, the boom engendered 
in all sections of the economy a situation where people turned to 
business to take advantage of the numerous economic development ventures 
taking place all over the country. Controlling the contract awards and 
other development programs in the new twelve states were soldiers, 
bureaucrats, commissioners and government executives. This enabled 
many to get rich quick, as well as enabled them the access to enlarge 
their connections. Therefore, the would be lawyers, gallant soldiers 
and politicians were diverted into petty bourgeoisie featuring as 
general contractors, importers/exporters, and other species of middlemen. 
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The issue was so pervasive that Gavin Williams noted that: 
...even the intelligentia, with its vested 
interest in ideological orientation towards 
modernizing policies has by and large been 
successfully institutionalized with the neo¬ 
colonial institutions.46 
The economic and political policies of General Yakubu Gowon led 
to a re-orientation in the Nigerian state. It produced in a rapid 
manner a large enriched class of leaders, and middlemen as well as 
aspiring middlemen. Above all, it created a power interest group 
within the army whose desire was to take over the position of leadership 
so as to control the expenditures. 
This chapter has therefore established the genesis upon which the 
fall of Gowon rested. As we shall see in the second part of this study, 
Gowon, by his programs, having established a political economy of 
state capitalism provided the basis for predatory struggle among 
middlemen for state patronage and unprincipled competition among public 
officials for control of financially lucrative government decisions. 
6Gavin Williams, "Class Relations in a Neo-colony: The Case of 
Nigeria," African Social Studies, A Radical Reader; ed., Peter Gutkind 
and Peter Waterman (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977), p. 284. 
CHAPTER III 
POWER INTEREST GROUPS WITHIN 
THE NIGERIAN ARMED FORCES 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the first assumption of 
the study that the fall of General Yakubu Gowon was due to power 
competition between the Gowon faction and another faction (power 
interest group) who wanted to seize power and be the rulers of Nigerian 
politics--a position that would allow them to control the vast economy 
of the country. 
There have been two schools of thought regarding the motives or 
causes of military takeovers in developing nations and in Africa in 
particular. The first stresses societal and structural weaknesses on 
the part of the ruling class whose awful performance acts as a sort of 
magnet by pulling the armed forces into power. A prolific writer of 
this category is Prof. Samuel Huntington, who argues that: 
The most important causes of military intervention 
in politics are not military, but political and 
reflect not the societal and organizational charac¬ 
teristics of the military establishment but the 
political and institutional structure of society.47 
A second school of thought contends that government corruption 
was readily used as a tool for army intervention. Dennis Austin, 
47S. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, ed 
John J. Johnson (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1979), p. 192. 
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a believer in this school, remarked that "the charge of corruption 
is usually used ex post facto to justify intervention by military 
forces. 
Contrary to the above schools of thought, this chapter looks at 
the military coup that overthrew Gowon's Administration in terms of 
competing ambitions for political leadership of Nigeria on the part 
of some military officers who had a great deal of freedom for action 
in the Nigerian political system within the period under study for 
personal economic aggrandizement. 
Therefore, contemporary economic situation at the time under study 
is brought into focus with a few of using this economic factor as a 
basis for testing the hypothesis that the officers who overthrew Gowon 
were self-seeking colonels and brigadiers whose true but hidden motive 
for the coup was for: 
....personal and corporate aggrandizement in a 
societal context of acute scarcity and intense 
competition from other elites such as the intel¬ 
lectuals, and politicians.49 
For the purpose of easier understanding let us start by delineating 
both factions involved in the competition for political and economic 
control of the country. 
48 Dennis Austin, "The Underlying Problems of the Army Coup d1 etat 
in Africa," Soldiers in Politics, Military Coups and Governments (London 
Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 193. 
49 Samuel Decalo, Coups and Military in Africa, Studies in Military 
Style (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), p. 13. 
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The first (faction) was made up of General Yakubu Gowon--the Head 
of State, his State Governors, Commissioners and top civil servants. 
The second group was made up of officers in the rank of colonels, and 
brigadiers; most of whom took active part in the Nigerian Civil War as 
either Sector Commanders, Brigade Commanders, or Supply Officers. 
Prominent in this group, popularly referred to as "War Officers," 
were Brigadier Murtala Mohammed, Brigadier Olusegun Obasanjo, 
Brigadier Theophilus Danjuma , and Col. Shehu Yar' Adua. 
With Yakubu Gowon's determination to heal the nation's wounds, 
facilitated by the money from the sudden oil boom, the 
...Nigerian economy emerged from the war as the 
most promising in tropical Africa. Therefore, 
after the war, the Second National Development 
Plan 1970-74 was launched as a means of recon¬ 
structing the facilities damaged by the Civil 
War, and to promote economic and social develop¬ 
ment throughout the country.50 
In agriculture, most of the farms and plantations abandoned during 
the Civil War, particularly in the East-Central State and Southeastern 
States were rehabilitated and brought back into production. To ensure 
high yields, the government intensified its extension services and 
increased the importation of fertilizers and other requirements to 
farmers during the Plan period. 
In manufacturing the government embarked on revival of old projects 
to speed up economic recovery. Examples were the revival of both 
50 V. A. Olorunsola, Soldiers and Power, the Development Performance 
of the Nigerian Military Regime (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 
1977), p. 19. 
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Calabar and Nkalagu Cement factories. Large petrochemical and nitro¬ 
genous fertilizer projects were started in Kaduna. While motor car 
assemblies were embarked upon a Lagos (Volkswagen) and Kaduna (Peugeot). 
With regard to transportation, construction of modern roads was 
started all over the country. Besides, the airport at Enugu had been 
reconstructed while contracts had been awarded for construction of 
new airports at Kano, Lagos, Jos, Ilorin, Benin City and Calabar. The 
National Shipping Line bought two new ships during the period. Still 
further, the Nigerian Airways acquired two Boeing 707 ' s, two Boeing 
737's and F-28 aircrafts during the Plan period. 
Development in education was not left behind: 
Primary level enrollment rose from 3.5 million in 
1970 to 4.5 million in 1973. At the secondary 
level, the number of students almost doubled from 
about 343,300 in 1970-71 to approximately 649,900 
in 1973-74. Twenty new Federal Government second¬ 
ary schools, four new colleges of technology, and 
three new schools of arts and sciences at Ogoja and 
Sokoto were reconstructed. Moreover, there was 
expansion in university enrollment, during the 
period, total enrollment which stood at 14,500 in 
1970-71 had risen to enrollment figures of 25,000 
in 1973-74 academic year.51 
Yet the most important area that advanced during this period was 
Nigerian external trade. According to the Permanent Secretary of the 
Ministry of Finance. 
In 1973-74 the value of exports stood at N2,278 
billion which was almost double the figure of 
HI,248 billion indicated in the Plan period. 
This improvement was due almost entirely to 
51Second National Development Plan, Interim Report, Federal 
Ministry of Statistics (Lagos: 1974), p. 20. 
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increases in both the price and output of crude 
oil.52 
Within this period, Nigeria under Gowon maintained a very high 
upward movement of imports of goods as cement, iron, and steel. These 
goods assisted in facilitating economic development through construc¬ 
tion of the necessary infrastructure. 
Under the above circumstances, considerable competition developed 
in the international business arena among multinational corporations 
as well as individual businesses to have some kind of business relation¬ 
ship with Nigeria. It also generated a situation where Nigerians 
constituted themselves into various species of middlemen, importer/ 
exporter, brokers and the like. 
Now that we have described the general economic situation, we may 
proceed to demonstrate how individual actors attempted to enrich them¬ 
selves by manipulating the use of state power. Two case studies are 
offered to dramatize the point: one involving the auction sale of 
oil, and the other, the appointment of a technocrat into decision making 
position in the oil sector. 
As we are aware, the preponderance of relationships between 
countries are economic. And as already noted, Nigeria has an import/ 
export economy as well as an indigenous business community engaged 
largely in commerce. By describing how this commercial system operated, 
I hope to demonstrate how a policy of state intervention to promote 
economic development intensified competition and introduced a new set 
ro 
Second National Development Plan, Interim Report, Federal Ministry 
of Statistics (Lagos: 1974), p. 24. 
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of actors, the new actors being those who overthrew the government of 
General Yakubu Gowon. 
A respectable theorist in the field of commercial capitalism is 
Terisa Turner. According to her, countries with commercial capitalism 
are those which depend on foreign industrial production for virtually 
all locally consumed manufactured goods. This aptly described the 
Nigerian economy under Gowon. According to her studies, in a commercial 
capitalist country, import/export, distribution, transport, wholesale, 
retail and petty trading are the main business features. Hence, in this 
kind of situation, commercial activity takes the form of middlemanship 
with the local businessman organizing the foreign seller's access to 
the local market. All the same, in a country that practices state 
capitalism, the state becomes the major buyer and uses its position 
as a state to regulate other commercial activities. The net result of 
this, she argued: 
...is that since the state controls opportunities 
to profit through commerce, politics becomes 
dominated by struggles for positions in the state 
or for access to those who have influence over 
government decision.53 
The relationship between foreign businessmen and local actors 
from the national private and public sectors, she called "Commercial 
Triangle." Parties to this triangle include the businessman who 
represents the multinational corporations, the local middlemen who 
assists the former in gaining access to the local market and the state 
53 
Panther Bricks, "Commercial Capitalism and the 1975 Coup," 
Soldiers and Oil, the Transformation of Nigeria (London: Frank, Cass 
and Company, Ltd., 1979), p. 169. 
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comprador who uses his offices to perpetuate the cycle. Perhaps a 
better way of explaining the issue of commercial triangular relationship 
would be the diagram shown below. 
Panther Bricks, Soldier and Oil (London: Frank Cass and 
Company, Ltd., 1977), p. 171. 
Source: 
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The above diagram shows a commercial triangular relationship 
between the state comprador, the foreign interest representative, and 
a local middleman. Since Nigeria practices state capitalism, would-be 
political actors aspire to occupy the most unique position of state 
comprador. It was the competition to occupy this position that motivated 
the power interest group to seek to oust Gowon. 
As discussed earlier, only two case studies shall be discussed to 
validate the above assertion, one being the Oil Auction Sale, and the 
other the appointment of Mr. Ordor. The relationship between these 
examples and the study is that the two inicidents were offered by the 
coup makers as justification for overthrowing General Yakubu Gowon. 
In addition to the three parties to the practice of commercial 
capitalism, the state capitalist country is influenced by another group 
of actors--the technocrats. Technocrats could be broadly referred to 
as people with professional training in some area of production who 
are in the public corporations. Therefore, the division of labor in 
such an economic setting would require an interdependence among special¬ 
ists (technocrats) and the other three who constitute the commercial 
triangle. 
In the words of Terisa Turner (a well-known Nigerian-based British 
political scientist): 
The political economy of a commercial capitalist 
society is defined largely by efforts to establish 
triangular relations and to operate them profitably. 
Instability is endemic in the struggle among middle¬ 
men for state patronage and in the competition 
among officials of state for control of decisions. 
In these circumstances politics is a form of busines 
through which actors seek influence in the state not 
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in order to make and apply general rules, but in 
order to secure advantages.54 
Having established the surrounding events, which would lead to 
tension among officers, we shall proceed to illustrate how the tension 
between two strata of state capitalist officials (Gowon faction) versus 
a loose alliance of would-be compradors of state capitalist, who 
joined forces with some technocrats in making allegations against the 
former and their political advisers which brought the final collapse 
of Gowon regime. 
As we noted earlier in the study, although large quantities of 
oil were discovered in Nigeria as far back as 1958, the civilian govern¬ 
ment (1960-65) took little interest in oil, and so no policy was 
initiated. However, after January 1966, the Shell-BP, a pioneer and 
major oil producing company in Nigeria, offered the new military regime 
improved financial terms. Since the issue had to do with funds, they 
were handed over to the Ministry of Finance who established a petroleum 
section to develop oil policies. However, although a Ministry of 
Mines and Power existed at this time, there is no reported evidence of 
any significant functions it performed regarding the oil; apart from 
the traditional regulation of foreign oil companies. 
Nevertheless, Adbul Atta, the Permanent Secretary to the Ministry 
of Finance and latter Secretary to the Federal Military Government used 
his influence with General Yakubu Gowon to advocate a strong state role 
in the oil industry. Above that, he took a step further by forming 
54 
Panther Bricks, "Commercial Capitalism and the 1975 Coup," 
Soldiers and Oil, the Transformation of Nigeria (London: Frank, 
Cass and Company, Ltd., 1979), p. 182. 
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cadres of professionals and technicians to handle each post in the 
oil business. By 1972, he had successfully sold to Gowon the idea of 
Nigeria's joining OPEC, and also set up two oil related institutions. 
One was the Petroleum Advisory Board while the other was the Nigerian 
National Oil Corporation whose duties were "to advise and implement 
55 
policies regarding oil in a coordinated and efficient way." 
Meanwhile, with increased revenue from oil and Nigeria's subsequent 
heavy reliance on it, the Ministry of Mines and Power viewed with 
suspicion the expansion of the Ministry of Finance into what it regarded 
56 
as "her sphere of interest." 
Under the Nigerian Second National Development Plan 1970-74, dozens 
of parastatals were established. These were known as corporations and 
were operated as public enterprises. However, what was important was 
the efficient management of the oil. The decree establishing the 
Nigerian National Oil Corporation (NNOC) had established that: 
...the Chairman of the NNOC's Board was the 
Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Mines and 
Power, while the Chief Executive was to be 
appointed by the Federal Executive Council on 
the advice of the Commissioner for Mines and 
Power.57 
With this, two things then stemmed out. The Ministry of Mines 
and Power had to start afresh building up its staff of petroleum 
550. Ojiako, Thirteen Years of Military Rule 1966-1979 (Lagos: 
Daily Times Press, 1980), p. 143. 
^P. C. Asiodu, "Some Aspects of Nigerian Oil Policy, 1971-1975" 
(Lagos: Duplicated, 1977), p. 2. 
^Decree No. 18 of 1971, Establishing the Nigerian National Oil 
Corporation, April 1971. 
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technocrats while those in the Ministry of Finance, prior to 1971, had 
to stay without jobs. It was at this point that opposition and 
competition evolved among the technocratic faction involved with the 
most valued commodity and mainstay of Nigerian--oil. As we shall now 
see, "the confrontation that gradually grew in the oil sector led to 
each person involved trying to curry support from any higher officer 
CO 
for intervention." 
The first major open confrontation arose in connection with a 
crude oil auction sale in 1973, the year oil was scarce on the inter¬ 
national market. Following the example of other OPEC countries NNOC's 
Marketing Division advertised an auction and called for bids. The 
Ministry of Mines and Power had not officially authorized the Oil 
Corporation to undertake an auction of crude oil nor could it order 
the halt of the exercise under the tense situation. 
Meanwhile, exports were expected to start on January of 1974. 
The Nigeria National Oil Corporation made a great effort to have buyers 
chosen and contracts signed. Consequently, by December 18th and 19th 
the NNOC sent invitations to companies to state whether they were 
interested in purchasing the oil at the price offered by the higest 
bidder in the auction exercise. According to P. C. Asiodu: 
Seven companies responded on December 21, 1973 
with mandates to bid. By the following day Texas 
Chemical and Plastics, Coastal States, and Phillips 
Petroleum had agreed to pay $22.60 per barrel for 
about 40,000 bd each, over a two year period with 
^Terisa Turner, "Oil Administrators and the 1975 Coup," Soldiers 
and Oi 1, ed. K. Panther Bricks, p. 180. 
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contract revisions possible each three months 
in accord with market conditions.59 
Nevertheless, when these companies arrived to conclude the oil deal, 
they were told that the crude, except 50,000 barrels reserved for the 
Ghana Supply Corporation which had been promised oil by General Gowon, 
would not be sold again. A few days later, the oil was sold to companies 
that were not among the original bidders, "at prices which were low 
compared to those offered in the auction bid."^ 
Given the shady manner in which the oil sale was handled, tremendous 
excitement and anger was generated among Nigerian state officials, 
technocrats and businessmen who bidded for the oil unsuccessfully. 
Asiodu, in his article, published after the fall of Gowon recounted that: 
More generally, some military officers and Nigerian 
businessmen viewed the action as one more manifes¬ 
tation of state monopoly in a lucrative area and 
these middlemen who were frustrated in their attempts 
to secure oil compared their failure with the conspi¬ 
cuous success of one Nigerian who mediated in the 
earlier Gelsenberg and Tenneco Ministry sales.51 
In another account, the Seven Sisters reports that after the above 
incidence, the NNOC prepared a price proposal to be adopted in the 
marketing of Nigerian oil: 
When the Ministry expressed reluctance to adopt the 
proposals, NNOC technocrats went to Gowon who backed 
their price regime. The example of NEPA workers in 
dislodging Asiodu and Gowon's support on the price 
issue encouraged NNOC management to take a stand on 
the way it and oil policy were being administered. 
^P. C. Asiodu, "Some Aspects of Nigerian Oil Policy 1971-75" 
(Lagos: Duplicated, 1977), p. 2. 
^Financial Times (London: February 17, 1976), p. 10. 
61 Terisa Turner, Commercial Capitalism and the Fall of Gowon. 
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In so doing, technocrats supplied state officials 
with a record of Ministry activities in oil. 
NNOC's submissions, commonly known as the first 
and second memoranda, apparently triggered 
actions which contributed to the overthrow of the 
Gowon regime.62 
The above, in its entirety, demonstrates the hidden interest in 
oil business held by private indigenous businessmen and military officers. 
Real izing how much harm this kind of involvment over oil business could 
bring to the government's integrity, Gowon decided to once and for all 
settle the issue of having to appoint a General Manager to entirely 
manage the Nigerian National Oil Corporation. In Kirk Green's account: 
Both the Head of State and the Commissioner con¬ 
sidered that the position of G. M. NNOC must be held 
by an indigence. The Permanent Secretary was 
instructed to make suggestions which were subse¬ 
quently submitted to the Commissioner on April 1, 
1975.63 
According to the same source, the Permanent Secretary of Mines 
and Power's choice for General Manager was Mr. I. G. T. Ordor, then 
head of the country's only refinery at Port Harcourt. One of the two 
other candidates was backed by Murtala Mohammed. S. K. Panther Bricks 
records that: 
The view was widely held that Ordor was subject 
to Asiodu's influence. Secondly, that he pro¬ 
minently supervised Biafra oil production during 
the Civil War; he went on to conclude that one of 
the members of the Federal Executive Council, 
Murtala Mohammed, backed a candidate with only 
four year work experience in a job with Agip since 
graduation, but he was from the North.64 
The Seven Sisters, Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, Issue No. 2 
(London: Hodder and Strough, October 1975). 
C o 
A. H. M. Kirk Green, Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria: A Documen¬ 
tary Source Book, Vol. II (Londonl Oxford University Press, 1978). 
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By July 4, 1975, Mr. Ordor's name appeared along with names of 
other candidates who had little or no experience in oil. After much 
debates on the issue at the Federal Executive Council, Mr. Ordor was 
appointed the new General Manager of the Nigerian National Oil 
Corporation. Brigadier Murtala Mohammed is reported to have interrupted 
General Gowon, challenging the final appointment of Mr. Ordor in favor 
of his candidate, ending his speech with the words "It would have been 
more honorable for Gowon to announce that he had appointed the man 
65 himself by excutive order." The explosive Executive Council session 
ended on that note with Gowon maintaining that Mr. Ordor assume the 
position of General Manager of the NNOC. 
The result of Murtala's discontent over the failure of Gowon to 
appoint his candidate to be the General Manager of the Nigeria National 
Oil Corporation was revealed exactly twenty-five days after the fateful 
Council Meeting. On that day, July 29, 1975, General Gowon had left 
for the OAU Meeting at Kampala, Uganda; it was announced that he was 
no longer the Head of State due "to the events of the last few months. 
Murtala Mohammed, the new Head of State explained that the affairs of 
State had become "characterized by lack of consultation, indecision, 
67 
indiscipline and even neglect." 
^P. C. Asiodu, "Some Aspects of Nigerian Oil Policy 1971-1975" 
(Lagos: Duplicated, 1977). 
r r 
Joseph Garba, Radio Broadcast to the Nation, July 29, 1975. 
^Murtala Mohammed, Inaugural Address to the Nation, July 30, 
1975. 
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As event would show, Murtala Mohammed demonstrated that he ousted 
Gowon for selfish reasons when on the 6th of August 1975, about seven 
days after Gowon had been ousted, he revoked Mr. Ordor's appointment 
as the General Manager of NNOC. The letter which was signed by 
Brigadier Obasanjo read, "In view of the fact that your appointment was 
not regular, it has been decided that the appointment be terminated." 
On the thirteenth of the same month, Murtala Mohammed banned permanent 
secretaries from Federal Executive Council Meetings unless specifically 
invited. Worst occurred on the twelveth of September, when Permanent 
Secretary Asiodu, whom Murtala Mohammed had transferred from the Ministry 
of Mines and Power (Oil Ministry) to the Ministry of Housing and 
Environment, was retired from the Civil Service. 
The above case study vividly provides indications of the utility 
of the general framework of the Nigeria political economy visa-a-vis 
commercial traingularrelationship illustrated earlier in showing how 
cut-throat competition led to the desire to control the oil production 
of Nigeria and led to the overthrow of Gowon. The gradual removal of 
P. C. Asiodu the Permanent Secretary of Mines and Power serves as a 
pointer to the grand design of the new actors to manipulate and control 
the oil business. 
With the understanding of how the power interest groups successfully 
took over political power, we shall now take a step further to view in 
detail how this group, after ousting Gowon, distributed the strategic 
political positions among themselves. We shall also look at how they 
flanked themselves with promotion and wealth. 
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In doing this, it would be proper to first of all identify some 
of the key actors and their motives. Murtala Mohammed was first seen 
during the July 1966 coup against Major General Ironsi's rule. During 
the Nigerain Civil War he was seen again when his bravery repelled the 
Biafran Army from Midwest State. He subsequently led the Second 
Division as commander. After the War he was promoted by Gowon and made 
the Federal Commissioner of Communications in appreciation of his 
contributions during the Civil War. 
Lt. Col. Olusegun Obasanjo's prominence started during the Civil 
War. As an officer in charge of the Engineers Corps of the Second Division 
his task was to rebuild the bridges on Ore-Benin Road. His performance 
here assisted the Federal troops in the offensive counter attack they 
waged against the rebels who were heading for Lagos. At the tail end 
of the Civil War he was appointed to replace Brigadier Adekunle as the 
Commander of the Third Division (Third Marine Commando). It is believed 
that his tactical surprise on the Biafrans at Ulli Airport, through the 
creek rather than by land, dealt the final blow on the Biafrans; who 
then had no other choice but to surrender. At the end of the Civil War, 
he was also compensated when General Gowon appointed him to the post 
of Federal Commissioner of Works.^ 
Other prominent officers were Col. Yisa Dokko, who served as the 
Chief of Air Operations during the Civil War; Commander Adelanwa, who 
served as the Chief of Naval Operations during the Civil War; 
A. Arnold, Power Politics in Nigeria (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1977), p. 70. 
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Theophilus Danjuma, who served as a Sector Commander during the Civil 
War; and Joseph Garba, who was the Commandant, Federal Brigage of Guards, 
Lagos. 
Since it was the Federal Government military troops who won the 
Civil War, the war officers were acclaimed war heroes by the people 
of Nigeria; consequently, they had political favor of being appointed 
Commissioners to the Federal Offices, parastatals and government agencies. 
The officers therefore believed that the survival of the nation depended 
on them. Sources holds the views that: 
...the officers were hardly satisfied with their 
present positions compared to the State Governors 
who had opportunties to award contracts and had 
fed themselves fat, while they (war officers) 
were in the war front for three years.69 
Under these circumstances tension of hatred, jealousy and over¬ 
zealousness grew among the war officers to be in command of the nation's 
body politics. Before this escalated to the open, both Udoji and Adebo 
Commissions, instituted by Gowon to look into the problems of the public 
sector, had appealed to Nigerians for "cooperative relationships among 
people" and not a "contest for power and rewards." According to the 
report, this contest for position of power had: 
...led to animosity and jealousy between professional 
officers and adminstrators, between administrators and 
intellectuals and had led to the impression that 
Nigerians do not like each other.70 
cq 
Jidda Ibrahim Wazri, Personal comment on the discussion on why 
Gowon was overthrown. 
^Udoji Report, West Africa, Vol. 3050 (December 8, 1975), p. 1473. 
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As Table IV, on the following page points out, all the prominent 
war officers took the strategic offices as soon as they succeeded in 
removing Gowon. 
They entrenched themselves in the positions they long aspired for 
by promoting themselves to the shoes of those removed from the Gowon 
government. Hence, by the 8th of January 1976, the new promotions were 
announced and dated back to the 29th of July 1975, the very day Gowon 
was ousted. 
However, it is important to point out that the selfish aggrandizement 
of this set of officers was soon detected, or at best suspected, by the 
Nigerian masses who questioned the authenticity of the promotions nearly 
five months after they (new leaders) overthrew Gowon's government, 
where the officers had stayed on specific ranks for over six years. 
In a response to critics of the promotions, Lt. General Theophilus 
Danjuma said "Nigerian Army officers were "rank shy" in the past, but the 
time had come for them to assume the ranks commensurate with their 
responsibility.^ 
Ironically, a month after these promotions were made, another 
coup occurred in Nigeria. Although this coup failed to come to power, 
it succeeded in assassinating General Murtala Mohammed, and in answering 
questions relating to the reasons for the abortive coup, Lt. Col. Joseph 
Dimka told the presiding judges (court marshall) that: 
The coup plotters were opposed to the recent 
promotions of Brigadiers to Generals. They 
were particularly critical of the appointment 
of Theophilus Danjuma as Chief of Army Staff. 
^Daily Times, January 17 , 1976, p. 8. 
TABLE IV 
THE POSITIONS OCCUPIED BY THE OFFICERS WHO OUSTED GOWON DURING THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR, SOON AFTER THE 
CIVIL WAR, AND AFTER THE SUBSEQUENT OVERTHROW OF GENERAL YAKUBU GOWON FROM OFFICE AS THE HEAD OF STATE 
AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE NIGERIAN ARMED FORCES 
Name Postion at War 
Post Civil War Position 
Under Gowon Position After Coup 
Brigadier M. Mohammad Commander Second Division Federal Commissioner of 
Communications 
Head of State and Commander 
in Chief of Nigerian Armed 
Forces 
Lt. Col.O. Obasanjo Officer-in-charge, Army 
Engineer Corps, Commander 
Third Division 
Federal Commissioner of 
Works 
Chief of Staff Supreme 
Headquarters 
Brig.I.D.Bisalla Commander First Division Commander Defense Academy Federal Commissioner of 
Defense 
Col.J.Garba Commander Federal Brigade 
of Guards 
Position Constant Federal Commissioner of 
External Affairs 
Lt. Col. Yar Adua Deputy of Garba, Federal 
Brigade of Guards 
Position Constant Federal Commissioner of 
Transport 
Col. Adekunle Handed over to Lt. Col. 
Obasanjo as Commander of 
Third Division (3rd 
Marine Commando) 
General Manager Nigerian 
Airways, Was Dismissed 
from Army by Gowon when 
Found Guilty of High Level 
Ills of Drug Deals and 
Corruption 
Dismissal Revoked to Read 
Retired 
Source: 0. Oyediran, "A Reflection on the 1975 Coup," Survey of Nigerian Affairs 1976-77 (Nigerian 
Institute of International Affairs, 1978), p. 290. 
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TABLE V 
THE NEW RANKS OF GOWON'S OUSTERS AND THE 
DAYS THEIR PROMOTION BECAME EFFECTIVE 
Name and Rank 
Before Coup 
New Ranks Five 
Months Later Effective Date 
Brig. M. Mohammed General July 29, 1975 
Brig. 0. Obassanjo Lt. General July 29, 1975 
Brig. T. Y. Danjuma Lt. General January 1, 1976 
Brig. I. D. Basalla Major General January 1, 1976 
Lt. Col. Shehu Yar-Adua Brigadier January 1, 1976 
Col. Joseph Garba Brigadier January 1, 1976 
Source: Federal Government Gazette, February 1976. 
To restore General Yakubu Gowon to the leadership 
of the country, they argued that he was not given 
a chance to change his style of leadership which 
they acknowledge to be purposeless and corrupt.72 
Another pointer to the selfish interest designed by the power 
interest group for overthrowing Gowon is revealed when we examine their 
social behavior. This suggests that the group could not be exonerated 
from corruption for which Gowon was allegedly removed. An example of 
this is the ten billion Naira (N10 billion) telephone contract award 
through Chief Mosheed Abiola barely a few months after the overthrow 
720. Ojiako, "Dimka's Attempted Coup and Trial," Thirteen Years 
of Military Rule 1966-79 (Lagos: Daily Times Press, 1979), p. 147. 
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of General Yakubu Gowon. According to personal interviews with 
Miss Tokumbo and Jidda Ibrahim Waziri who were sisters-in-law to 
Murtala Mohammed and subordinate of Murtala Mohammed respectively, 
evidence suggest that M. K. Abiola was an in-law of Murtala Mohammed, 
as former Federal Commissioner of Communications and Signals was aware 
of the impending telephone construction contract award which the Gowon 
Administration was about to execute. According to this source: 
The relationship between M. K. Abiola and Murtala 
Mohammed vis-a-vis the expected kickback on the 
proposed telephone construction award acted as 
a major force in the sudden removal of Jack Gowon.^3 
Indeed when Murtala Mohammed assumed office as the Head of State 
of Nigeria, one of the first major contracts awarded by the Federal 
Ministry of Communications is said to be the telephone contract award. 
Another evidence was Dr. Ohonbamu's affidavit before the Benin 
Magistrate Court. The affidavit was a protest against the asset 
declaration exercise which Murtala Mohammed had requested of all top 
public office appointees. In the affidavit, Dr. Ohonbawu argued that 
although Murtala Mohammed declared his assets to the public a few 
months after the success of his coup, that such action was a strategy 
designed to cover up his (Mohammed's) share of the kickback from 
N10 billion telephone construction contract which he would use to 
offset his (Mohammed's) losses in the properties he declared for the 
Nigerian public. 
73 
The interview with Miss Tokumbo and Jidda Ibrahim was held some¬ 
times in November 1982. Tokumbo is a D.Pham student at Mercer University 
and a sister to the late General Murtala Mohammed's wife, while Jidda 
Ibrahim was a one-time secretary under M. Mohammed during the period 
Murtala Mohammed was the Head of State of Nigeria. 
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In addition to this evidence, the fact that it was made a campaign 
issue between Chief Obafemi Awolowo, a prominent Nigerian, and leader 
of the Unity Party of Nigeria versus Mosheed Abiola who was a member 
of the National Party of Nigeria during the 1979 election campaigns 
gives credence to the shady deal. According to Chief Awolowo, "when 
voted into power, I sincerely promise to release the details of the 
ten billion Naira ITT contract award."74 
It would therefore be adequate for us to close this chapter with 
an extract from Eric Nordlinger statement that: 
Coups are motivated by the defense or enhancement 
of the soldiers corporate interests. Despite the 
praetorians assertions to the contrary - despite 
their claims that they acted for public reasons on 
behalf of constituencies and nation. Almost all 
coups are at least partly and usually primarily 
inspired by the military's own interests. And 
while these interests partisan to the institution 
as a whole, it is clear that many individual 
officers desire special benefits from the reali¬ 
zation of corporate interests in the way of rapid 
promotions, salary increase and greater power and 
prestige as well as opportunities to enrich them¬ 
selves. 75 
7^0kion Ojigbo, "Election '79," Nigerian Returns to Civilian Rule 
(Lagos: Tokion (Nig) Company, 1980), p. 143. 
75E. A. Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics, Military Coups, and 
Governments (London: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 193. 
CHAPTER IV 
GENERAL GOWON'S ADMINISTRATIVE INEFFECTIVENESS 
IN DEALING WITH THE CONTINUING POLITICAL AND 
ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AFTER THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR 
In this last part of the study, we shall dwell on-my second 
assumption about the ineffectiveness of the Gowon Administration with 
emphasis on the post Nigerian Civil War era, with a view of determining 
howthecoup plotters capitalized on these shortcomings to overthrow 
Gowon. The analysis is strictly based on the Nine Points Program and 
its accompanying agencies initiated by General Gowon which were intended 
to act as his guideline in realizing what "the ordinary citizens want," 
being "peace and stability, the only condition under which progress and 
development are possible." 
The chapter uses the post Civil War Nine Points Program as a base 
because of the historical sequence of events at the time in question. 
Three phases of Gowon's rule were noticeable during the period 1966-1975. 
The first phase saw Gowon as a young soldier with primitive character¬ 
istics just emerging into the national political arena (July 29, 1966 
to 1967). The second phase saw Gowon combining his humane character¬ 
istics with a bit of thoughness at war (1967-1970). His last phase, 
1970-1975 showed him as an emerged proud and ambitious Head of State 
who had the audacity to tell his countrymen that: 
-68- 
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...from the general attitude, utterances and 
maneuvers of individuals and groups during 
the past few months, it is clear that those 
who aspire to lead the nation on the return 
to civilian rule have not learnt any lesson 
from our past experience. There is no doubt 
that it would not take them long to return 
to the old cut-throat politics that once led 
this nation into serious crisis.76 
Indeed, within this period he was followed by the citizens who 
had to adjust to his three postures. For example, in the inception 
of his Administration (1966-1967), he was viewed with skepticism as 
to his strength and ability of binding together the almost turn apart 
nation. At war (1967-1970), he was able to wield the entire support 
of the people of Nigeria and consequently winning the three years civil 
war. The post Civil War period produced a man who became intoxicated 
with earlier successes and prone to misjudge his actual relationship 
with his critics and peers and to perceive the relationship he now had 
with the people. It was an attempt to revive the continuity of the 
loyalty and support of the drifting masses that Gowon came up with 
the idea of the Nine Points Program in the early 1970's. 
Succinctly stated, the Nine Points Programes were the: 
1. Reorganization of the Armed Forces 
2. Implementation of the National Development Plan and repair 
of war damage 
3. Eradication of corruption from the national life 
4. Settlement of the question of more states 
5. Preparation and adoption of a new constitution 
76 General Yakubu Gowon, Radio Broadcast, October 1, 1974. 
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6. Introduction of a new revenue allocation formula 
7. Conducting a population census 
8. Organization of election of popularly elected governments 
in the states and at the centre 
As could be viewed, all the above programs were desirable in the 
post Civil War of Nigeria to ensure national harmony and national unity 
in good faith. We may combine two or more of these programs into 
functional areas so that we can understand their relationships to the 
coup. 
First, let us combine reorganization of the army, the implementation 
of the national development plan, repair of war damages, and introduction 
of a new revenue allocation formula into administrative measures on which 
some actions were unavoidable. 
The second category should be eradication of corruption from 
national life, and conducting a population census. These are grouped 
into one category with the view that considering the Nigerian political 
culture, they are moral ideals which would require considerable time 
to implement. While the settlement of the question of more states, new 
Constitution, organization of genuinely national political parties and 
conducting a civilian election respectively could be grouped into 
another category; since they were steps aimed at the restoration of 
civilian politics. 
As suggested earlier, it is my assumption that Gowon's inability 
to effectively channel the different organs of the government towards 
the realization of the above stated goals were the main factors that 
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contributed to the decision of his adversaries to overthrow him. It 
would also be my contention that it was the failure of this growing 
ineffectiveness that made most of the Nigerian masses direct over¬ 
whelming support to the power hungry young officers which then 
constituted their power base. 
At this juncture, it would be better to put our argument in a 
coherent but serial framework for easy understanding. Taking the issue 
of demobilization of the Army for instance, during the Civil War the 
Nigerian Army unprecedentedly rose to about a quarter of a million 
troops. After the war, the need to demobilize them became undeniable. 
From the military executives point of view, "many men were poorly 
equipped, inadequately trained (including many too rapidly promoted 
to the officer's ranks) and forced to live in make-shift accomodations. 
While from the civilian point of view, the army boys having returned 
from the war front, "became indisciplined, a threat to normal daily 
78 life and a drain on the public funds." In a statement by Chief 
Obafemi Awolowo who was the then Federal Commissioner of Finance, it 
was revealed that the amount being spent on defense and maintenance 
of the army was more than double what was being spent on two or more 
sectors combined. In addition, some of the soldiers constituted social 
threats to the innocent civilians, especially the traders who had to 
move from one state to another for business. They were always victims 
of soldiers turned armed robbers. The subsequent imposition of the 
^Soldiers and Oil, p. 20. 
78 
0. Ohonbawu, The Army and the People's Cause (Ibadan: African 
Educational Press, 1976), p. 76. 
77 
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death penalty for armed robbery is a pointer to the gravity of the 
situation. The major problem to the Gowon Government was of course 
how to demobilize the Army without increasing the urban unemployed 
and the number of armed robbers already in the street. To this threat, 
the most that the Gowon Administration could offer was: 
...his proposal to transfer some military men 
to more productive and less dangerous public 
employments by retraining them as either police¬ 
men, firemen, prison wardens or custom officials.79 
This was never put into reality. What was more, the image of the army 
as a social institution became a joke and served as a major area of 
ineffectiveness of the Gowon post civil war government. This contri¬ 
buted to the decline of respect and credibility he had in the minds 
of the Nigerian armed forces. 
Gowon's proposal to conduct a nation-wide census provided an 
opportunity for his military government to succeed where a civilian 
government had already failed. Thus, the issue of national census 
was another big test to Gowon's effectiveness at the time, not only 
because the 1963 census conducted by civilians turned out to be 
unreliable, but because in the Post Civil War Nigeria with economic 
bouyancy especially with the Second National Plan period and rehabili¬ 
tation efforts, national data were necessary. For example, data would 
be needed for the redrawing of the state boundaries, and for the 
determination of the constituencies towards the eventual return to 
civilian rule. Also, accumulated data was necessary for the allocation 
79 J. Oyinbo, Nigeria: Crisis and Beyond (London: Charles, Night 
and Company, Ltd., 1978), p. 71. 
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of revenues on a per capita basis. Gowon had employed soldiers to 
accompany each enumerator during the census, yet the figures were 
overly inflated in many areas. According to Jean Herskovitz: 
The preliminary results of the census which 
were expected shortly after the enumeration 
were not announced until May 1974. Those 
results and the ferment that followed them 
abruptly changed Gowon's plans. He is well 
aware of the political importance of the 
figures and announcing them in May he said, 
"The public should appreciate their provisional 
nature." The words "preliminary" and "provi¬ 
sional" appeared in his brief speech nine 
times. His reversal in saying the figures 
"should not, be used for planning purposes" 
showed the government's nervousness. For 
the provisional total was, he said, 79.76 
million; the 1963 figure, believed inflated 
had been 55.65 million. The total shocked 
Nigerians less, however, than the distribution 
among their twelve states. The six Northern 
States were said to have more than twice the 
numbers of the smaller but more densely popu¬ 
lated six Southern States.80 
This discredit to the regime brought about by the failure to conduct 
an effective census was damaging to the entire Army which had seen 
itself as a correction regime. 
Thus Gowon's continued failure to redeem his promises aroused the 
ill-feelings and suspicions of some sections of Nigeria, especially 
the class of old politicans who resigned before General Yakubu Gowon, 
who loved going back to politics, and young military officers who 
felt Gowon had overstayed his time. 
Another program where he failed was the eradication of corruption 
in the national life: dishonest practices were noted to have continued 
on 
Jean Herskovits, "Nigerian: Africa's New Power," Foreign Affairs, 
An American Quarterly Review, Vol. 53, (January 1975). 
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on a widespread basis and this no doubt was corrosive to the national 
morale. Encouraged by the post civil war oil boom (the era of petro- 
Naira), and the numerous developmental efforts, the rich had become 
richer while the poor got poorer with "the nation becoming foremost 
81 capitalist in outlook." This encouraged and heightened social vices 
as highway robbery, bribery, nepotism and corruption at its peak. 
Corruption was so widespread that the sales clerk at the post office 
was unlikely to sell stamps unless he is given something up front. 
Although the accusation of corruption was rampant, there is a school 
of thought which believes that such was campaign propaganda to bring 
the Gowon Administration down by some of the numerous power interest groups 
within the Nigerian body politik. An example of this viewpoint is 
Jean Herskovits who in "Nigeria: Africa's New Power." The Foreign 
Affairs, American Quarterly Review Journal argued that: 
...people with political ambitions, some of them 
politicians from pre-coup days - held forth in 
the press without restraints. They challenged 
census figures, forecasting revived North-South 
fears, and so fueling them. The lively newspapers 
did their own investigative reporting, searching 
out high-level corruption. Sometimes they found 
it, but they were more selective - Gowon thought 
vindictively so. All over the country one sensed 
excitement but also mounting nervousness as rumors 
piled on rumors, of political battle reminiscent 
of the sixties, and of eminent coups. The govern¬ 
ment did little to silence the critics while the 
press brought down one Federal Commissioner over 
charges of corruption and a Military Governor was 
similarly accused.82 
^^Ndika Otonfi, "The Rationality of the Rich in Nigeria," Africa 
Social Studies: A Radical Reader, ed. Peter Gut!and and Peter Waterman 
(New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977). 
op 
Foreign Affairs, An American Quarterly Review, Vol. 53, No. 2, 
(January 1975), p. 330. 
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The events discussed above all pointed to Gowon's paralysis 
in the face of unreformed political behavior. Gowon having been 
primarily responsible and able to hold the nation together in the 
difficult days of 1966-1970 was supposed to have known of the threat 
by the old politicans as well as the emergence of a new military elites, 
and would have strived to abide by certain promises especially the 
promise to return to civil rule. Instead, Gowon felt staying longer 
in office without silencing his critics would stop their ambitions. 
In his independence speech, October 1, 1974, he said: 
Four years ago when I gave 1976 as the target date 
for returning the country to normal constitutional 
government, both myself and the military hierarchy 
believed that by that date, especially after the 
bloody civil war for which there had been a great deal 
of human and material sacrifice and from which we 
had expected that every Nigerian would have learnt 
a lesson, there would have developed an atmosphere 
of sufficient, stability. 
We had thought that genuine demonstration of modera¬ 
tion and self control in pursuing sectional ends in 
the overall interest of the country would have become 
the second nature of all Nigerians. Regretably, from 
all the information at our disposal, from the general 
attitude, utterances and manoeuvres of some individuals, 
groups, and from some publications during the past four 
months it is clear that those who aspire to lead the 
nation on the return to civilian rule have not learnt 
any lesson from our past experiences. 
In spite of the existence of a state of emergency which 
has so far precluded political activity, there has 
already emerged a high degree of sectional politiking, 
intemperate utterances and writings which were deliber¬ 
ately designed to whip up ill-feelings within the coun¬ 
try to the benefit of the political aspirations of a 
few. There is no doubt that it would not take them long 
to return to the old cut-throat politics that once led 
this nation into serious crisis. We are convinced that 
this is not what the honest people of this country want.83 
83 General Yakubu Gowon, Radio Broadcast to the Nation, October 1, 1974. 
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Gowon finally declared the much expected target date of 1976 to 
be unrealistic, since "rigid adherence to it would be a betrayal of 
trust and would throw the nation back into confusion." No new target 
dates were fixed. This is where Gowon committed the greatest admini¬ 
strative error of his time. According to him, the military: 
...had the responsibility to lay the foundation of 
a self-sustaining political system which can stand 
the test of time in such a manner that each national 
political crisis does not become a threat to the 
nation's continued existence as a single entity which 
ensures a smooth and orderly transition from one 
government to another.84 
It is the desire of this study to point out that this was the 
administrative error that marked the fall of Gowon. Because, since 
there were recognized power interest groups waiting anxiously for 1976, 
the sudden change of program by Gowon would naturally be misrepresented 
as wanton monopoly of power by him. Above all, during the address, 
Gowon informed the Nigerian people that he would change all the military 
governors in 1976 while he remained as the Head of State. His failure 
to do this further depressed some military officers who felt eligible 
to be made Commissioners and Governors of States. 
As we shall see, immediately after the speech, commentators were 
quick to point out that Gowon's position was both unrealistic and 
irrational. The New Nigerian daily paper, for example, noted that: 
...the kind of peace and stability which the 
Commander-in-Chief seemed to want...is impossible 
in a huge and diverse country with a fairly well 
84 
1974. 
General Yakubu Gowon, Radio Broadcast to the Nation, October 1, 
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developed political culture and with the political 
power prize being the privilege to dispense vast 
resources.85 
Matters became worse when after this announcement the existing 
Military Governors decided to save for a rainy day. The Nine Point 
Programs were abandoned as the Military Governors and top civil 
servants indulged in an unquestionable "grab, grab" attitude, as well 
as in the appointment of friends and relatives into strategic positions 
to ensure or to perpetuate their sources of income when retired. 
According to the Nigerian Tribune, the "permanent secretaries became 
partners in crime with their political heads, and quite often the 
masterminds of business deals" 
It was the attitude according to Murtala Mohammed which was "the 
86 straw that broke the camel's back." 
In sum, tension between administrators in the Ministries, between 
military officers who felt inadequately compensated after the Civil War 
and the general competition to be the helm of political offices so as 
to be able to accumulate immediate wealth, all combined to unleash the 
coup which ousted Gowon on July 29, 1975. 
^New Nigerian, October 2, 1974. 
^West Africa (September 16, 1975), p. 1146. 
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